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Abstract
Plausible reasoning concerns situations whose inherent lack of precision is not quanti-
fied; that is, there are no degrees or levels of precision, and hence no use of numbers like
probabilities. A hopefully comprehensive set of principles that clarifies what it means for a
formal logic to do plausible reasoning is presented. A new propositional logic, called Propo-
sitional Plausible Logic (PPL), is defined and applied to some important examples. PPL is
the only non-numeric non-monotonic logic we know of that satisfies all the principles and
correctly reasons with all the examples. Some important results about PPL are proved.
1. Introduction
We are interested in reasoning about situations that (a) have imprecisely defined parts, and
(b) this lack of precision is not quantified. That is, there are no degrees or layers or levels
of precision, and in particular there are no numbers like probabilities, that would quantify
the lack of precision. These situations are often indicated by the ordinary, rather than
technical, use of words such as ‘mostly’, ‘usually’, ‘typically’, ‘normally’, ‘probably’, ‘likely’,
‘plausible’, ‘believable’, and ‘reasonable’. Although these words are not synonymous, they
share a common property, which may be expressed by using either frequency of occurrence
or weight of evidence. In frequency terms the property is that something is true more often
than not; in evidence terms the property is that the evidence for something outweighs the
evidence against it. An example is ‘Mammals usually are non-venomous’.
We shall call these situations plausible-reasoning situations because we shall call the
reasoning used in such situations plausible reasoning.
This article has two aims. The first is to introduce principles that give a much clearer
understanding of what it means for a formal logic to do plausible reasoning; that is the
kind of reasoning indicated above. The hope is that this set of principles is comprehensive.
Whether it is or not, this seems to be the first such set of principles even though plausible
reasoning has been used for at least 2500 years (Walton, Tindale, & Gordon, 2014). However
on page 114 of (Walton et al., 2014) there is a list of 11 characteristics of plausible reasoning,
rather than characteristics of formal logics that do plausible reasoning.
The second aim is to define a propositional logic, called Propositional Plausible Logic
(PPL), that satisfies all these principles of plausible reasoning. This shows that all the
principles together are consistent; that is, there is no principle whose negation is implied
by all the other principles. A pruned version of PPL is presented in (Billington, 2015).
In this paper we shall be considering only propositional situations; that is, situations
that can be fully represented by a propositionally adequate language. That is, by a language
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which has an adequate set of propositional connectives. The most common adequate sets
of connectives contain negation and at least one of conjunction, or disjunction, or material
implication. The connectives we shall use are negation ¬, conjunction
∧
, and disjunction
∨
. A propositionally adequate logic is a logic based on a propositionally adequate language.
Moreover we shall consider only those plausible-reasoning situations that can be specified
by a plausible-structure S = (Fact(S),Plaus(S)) where Fact(S) is a set of propositional
formulas representing the factual part of S, and Plaus(S) is a set representing the plausible
part of S. The elements of Plaus(S) can have a variety of forms; for example: defaults are
used in Reiter’s Default Logic (Reiter, 1980), defeasible rules are used in ASPIC (Caminada
& Amgoud, 2007) and ASPIC+ (Modgil & Prakken, 2013), and defeasible and warning
rules are used in Defeasible Logic (Billington, 2008). The plausible-structure syntax is very
general, while being specific enough to permit the definition of concepts needed later.
This article is organised into the following sections. The next section defines some ideas
and notation from classical propositional logic that are needed in Sections 3 and 5. Section
3 presents the principles of plausible reasoning. Section 4 contains a survey of various non-
numeric non-monotonic logics. The definition of PPL is in Section 5. In Section 6 we apply
PPL to some examples. In Section 7 we state and discuss some important properties of
PPL, and show that PPL satisfies all the principles in Section 3. Section 8 is the conclusion.
All the proofs are in the appendices.
2. A Classical Propositional Logic using Resolution
Formulas in classical propositional logics are usually defined using sequences, for example
(a ∨ (b ∨ a)). Sequences make unwanted distinctions which are often best removed, for
example neither order nor repetitions are needed. So the above example is more clearly
written as
∨
{a, b}. We shall define classical propositional formulas that are based on sets
rather than sequences. Such set-based formulas simplify the definition of resolution. The
classical notions of truth value, valuation, satisfaction, semantic consequence |=, tautology,
contradiction, equivalence of formulas, and resolution are as usual.
Let us start by agreeing on some notation. As usual ‘iff’ abbreviates ‘if and only if’. X
is a subset of Y is denoted by X⊆Y ; the notation X⊂Y means X⊆Y and X 6=Y , and
denotes that X is a strict subset of Y . The empty set is denoted by {}, and the set of all
integers by Z. The cardinality of a set S is denoted by |S|. If m and n are integers then we
define the integer interval [m..n] by [m..n] = {i∈Z : m ≤ i ≤ n}.
Our alphabet is the union of the following pairwise disjoint sets of symbols: a non-
empty countable set, Atm, of (propositional) atoms; the set {¬,
∧
,
∨
} of connectives with
¬,
∧
,
∨
denoting negation, conjunction, and disjunction respectively; and the set of punctu-
ation marks consisting of the comma and both braces.
We now define a formula.
Definition 2.1.
1) If a is an atom then a is a formula.
2) If f is a formula then ¬f is a formula.
3) If F is a finite set of formulas then
∧
F is a formula and
∨
F is a formula.
4) Every formula can be built by a finite number of applications of (1), (2), and (3).
The set of all formulas is denoted by Fml .
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It is convenient to write
∧
F and
∨
F even though the set F of formulas may be infinite.
The next three definitions define some special formulas, the set of all literals in a clause
or dual-clause, and the complement of a literal.
Definition 2.2.
1) The set, Lit , of all literals is defined by Lit = Atm ∪ {¬a : a∈Atm}.
2) A clause is either a literal or the disjunction,
∨
L, of a finite set, L, of literals.
3)
∨
{} is the empty clause or falsum.
4) A dual-clause is either a literal or the conjunction,
∧
L, of a finite set, L, of literals.
5)
∧
{} is the empty dual-clause or verum.
6) A formula is contingent iff it is not a tautology and it is not a contradiction.
Definition 2.3.
1) If l is a literal then Lit(l) = {l}.
2) If L is a finite set of literals then Lit(
∨
L) = L = Lit(
∧
L).
Definition 2.4. Let a be any atom and L be any set of literals.
1) The complement of a, ∼a, is defined by ∼a = ¬a.
2) The complement of ¬a, ∼¬a, is defined by ∼¬a = a.
3) The complement of L, ∼L, is defined by ∼L = {∼l : l∈L}.
Let C be any set of clauses. We want to remove from C all the clauses that, when
removed, will not change the truth value of
∧
C. By Lemma A.1(1) (See Appendix A) this
means removing all tautologies and all clauses that have a strict subclause in C. We also
want to simplify C by replacing any clause
∨
{l} in C by l. The result will be the core of C.
Dually, let D be any set of dual-clauses. We want to remove from D all the dual-
clauses that, when removed, will not change the truth value of
∨
D. By Lemma A.1(2) (See
Appendix A) this means removing all contradictions and all dual-clauses that have a strict
sub-dual-clause in D. We also want to simplify D by replacing any dual-clause
∧
{l} in D
by l. The result will be the core of D.
The following definition does both of these.
Definition 2.5. Let G be either a set of clauses or a set of dual-clauses.
1) The set of elements of G that are contingent or empty, Ctge(G), is defined by
Ctge(G) = {g∈G : g is contingent or empty}.
2) The set of minimal elements of G, Min(G), is defined by
Min(G) = {g∈G : if g′∈G then Lit(g′) 6⊂Lit(g)}.
3) The simplification of the formula f , smp(f), is defined as follows.
If f ∈{
∧
{g},
∨
{g}}, where g is a formula, then smp(f) = smp(g); else smp(f) = f .
4) The simplification of G, Smp(G), is defined by Smp(G) = {smp(g) : g∈G}.
5) The core of G, Cor(G), is defined by Cor (G) = Smp(Min(Ctge(G))).
Let C be any set of clauses. The set of all clauses derivable by resolution from clauses
in C is denoted by Res(C). Also we usually abbreviate Cor (Res(C)) to CorRes(C), and
Smp(Res(C)) to SmpRes(C).
We shall need to convert a formula f into a set Claus(f) of clauses, such that
∧
Claus(f)
is equivalent to f . Unfortunately there are many such sets of clauses, so we shall follow
Sections 2 and 3 of Chapter I of (Nerode & Shore, 1997) to define which set we mean.
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We shall denote the true truth value by T and the false truth value by F. Let Val denote
the set of all valuations, and Atm(f) denote the set of atoms in the formula f .
Definition 2.6. If A is a set of atoms then define Val(A), the set of valuations which are
false outside A, by Val(A) = {v∈Val : for all a in Atm−A, v(a) = F}.
So if |A| = n then |Val(A)| = 2n.
Definition 2.7. Let f be any formula, F any set of formulas, and v any valuation.
1) Define L(f, v) = {a : a∈Atm(f) and v(a) = T} ∪ {¬a : a∈Atm(f) and v(a) = F}.
2) Define Claus(f) = {
∨
∼L(f, v) : v∈Val(Atm(f)) and v(f) = F}.
3) Define Claus(F ) =
⋃
{Claus(f) : f ∈F}.
If a set F of formulas is unsatisfiable then classical propositional logic can prove any
formula from F ; that is, classical propositional logic is explosive. Explosive logics are not
ideal because, for unsatisfiable sets of formulas, the idea of ‘proof’ becomes worthless. For
example, let F1 = {a,¬a, b}. Then from F1 an explosive logic can prove ¬b, which does
not seem sensible. Logics that are not explosive are called paraconsistent logics. But we
want more than mere paraconsistency. In the example above, either a or ¬a seems to be a
mistake, so it would be reasonable that from F1 we can conclude only b, and what follows
from b.
Let F be an unsatisfiable set of formulas. There are several ways of getting a satisfiable
subset of F (see the literature on Belief Revision and Paraconsistent Logics). One way is
to take the intersection of all the maximal satisfiable subsets of F , (this is the full meet
contraction of F by a contradiction). An equivalent way is to remove all the minimal
unsatisfiable subsets of F . For example, let F2 = {a,¬a,
∨
{a, b}}. Then the (only) minimal
unsatisfiable subset of F2 is {a,¬a}. Removing this from F2 leaves {
∨
{a, b}}. Alternatively
the intersection of all the maximal satisfiable subsets of F2 is also {
∨
{a, b}}.
However, another way to get a satisfiable subset of F is to remove all the formulas of
F that are ‘contaminated’ by potential errors, as follows. First we convert F to the set of
clauses Claus(F ). Then F is unsatisfiable iff Claus(F ) is unsatisfiable iff Res(Claus(F ))
contains a literal, say l, and its complement, ∼l. At least one of l and ∼l is an error.
Certainly both l and ∼l are potential errors. Potential errors contaminate any clause
containing them, making the clause unreliable. We then remove all the contaminated clauses
from Claus(F ) to get the result Sat(Claus(F )).
Applying this to F2 we see that Claus(F2) = {
∨
{a},
∨
{¬a},
∨
{a, b}} and the set,
Err(Claus(F2)), of potential error literals of Claus(F2) is Err(Claus(F2)) = {a,¬a}. Hence
very clause in Claus(F2) is contaminated by a potential error, and so Sat(Claus(F2)) = {}.
The formal definition of the functions Err(.) and Sat(.) follows.
Definition 2.8. Let C be any set of clauses.
Err(C) = {l∈Lit : {l,∼l}⊆SmpRes(C)}.
Sat(C) = {c∈C : c 6=
∨
{} and Lit(c)∩Err (C) = {}}.
Of course if C is satisfiable then Sat(C) = C. If C is any set of clauses then Sat(C) is
satisfiable, and so Sat(Sat(C)) = Sat(C).
Let C be a set of clauses. It can be shown that every literal in every clause in every
minimal unsatisfiable subset of C is a potential error literal and so is in Err(C). But Sat(C)
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removes all the clauses that contain any potential error literal, not just the clauses that are
composed entirely of potential error literals. Hence the clauses in Sat(C) may be regarded
as at least as reliable as the clauses in the intersection of all the maximal satisfiable subsets
of C, as some of these clauses may contain potential error literals, as happens with F2.
We can now define our paraconsistent propositional logic by mimicking the standard
definition of proof by resolution, which we shall also define.
Definition 2.9. Let F be any set of formulas and f be any formula.
As usual, define F proves f (by resolution), denoted by F ⊢ f , as follows.
F ⊢ f iff
∨
{} ∈ Res(Claus({¬f}∪F )).
Define F judiciously proves f , denoted by F  f , as follows.
F  f iff
∨
{} ∈ Res(Claus(¬f)∪Sat(Claus(F ))).
Explosiveness is a symptom of the fact that, from a set F of formulas, classical logic
proves formulas that, arguably, do not follow from F . For example, if a and b are different
atoms then from the contradiction
∧
{a,¬a} we can prove b. Because b has nothing to do
with a or ¬a, our intuition is that b does not follow from
∧
{a,¬a}. Although ‘follows from’
is an intuitive concept rather than a formal one, we shall attempt to formally define the
concept. To refine our intuition let us consider tautologies.
Let F be a set of formulas, f and g be formulas, L and M be finite sets of literals, and
t be a tautology.
A) We could argue that tautologies stand on their own, they do not depend on any other
formula. So if t /∈F then t does not follow from F .
B) We would like ‘follows from’ to be syntax independent. That is, if f follows from F and
f is equivalent to g then g follows from F .
C) If f ∈F then it seems reasonable that f follows from F .
D) If
∨
L follows from F and L ⊆M then it seems reasonable that
∨
M follows from F .
E) If a and b are different atoms then it seems reasonable that
∨
{a,¬a} does not follow
from {
∨
{b,¬b}}. By (C),
∨
{b,¬b} follows from {
∨
{b,¬b}}. But this would make ‘follows
from’ syntax dependent, contrary to (B).
So tautologies present difficulties for any definition of ‘follows from’. However, in Section 3
we do not want to force all tautologies to be provable, so we shall declare that tautologies
do not follow from any set of formulas. Thus we arrive at the following definition.
Definition 2.10. Let F be any set of formulas. Define Taut to be the set of all
tautologies. Define the set of formulas that follow from F , From(F ), by
From(F ) = {f ∈Fml : F  f} − Taut .
Since Sat(Claus(F )) ⊆ Claus(F ) we have
From(F ) ⊆ {f ∈Fml : F  f} ⊆ {f ∈Fml : F ⊢ f}.
3. Principles of Plausible Reasoning
Lists of postulates, properties, or principles that concern special types of reasoning are
useful for at least the following reasons.
1) They help characterise the intended special type of reasoning.
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2) They provide a means of evaluating existing reasoning systems to see how well they
perform the intended special type of reasoning.
3) They provide guidelines for creating new reasoning systems for the intended special
type of reasoning.
4) They explicitly show a difference between the intended special type of reasoning and
an existing form of reasoning.
Notable examples of such lists are the following. The AGM postulates for belief change
(Alchourro`n, Ga¨rdenfors, & Makinson, 1985; Ga¨rdenfors, 1988), various properties of non-
monotonic consequence relations (Makinson, 1988; Kraus, Lehmann, & Magidor, 1990),
and the postulates that a rule-based argumentation system should satisfy (Caminada &
Amgoud, 2007).
We shall state the principles of this section by referring to the logic or proof algorithm
directly; rather than by referring to consequence relations. A consequence relation, say |∼,
relates a set F of formulas to a formula f ; where F |∼ f means that f is a consequence of F .
Consequence relations are appropriate if the reasoning situations under consideration can
be characterised by a set of formulas. But the plausible-reasoning situations we consider are
specified by a plausible-structure S = (Fact(S),Plaus(S)) where the elements of Plaus(S)
may be very different from the formulas in Fact(S). For these situations consequence
relations are much less appropriate. For example consider two fundamental properties that
consequences relations may have; namely cut and cautious monotonicity, which together
are equivalent to cumulativity, also called lemma addition. If F and G are sets of formulas
then let F |∼ G mean for all g in G, F |∼ g. Then cumulativity is the following property.
If F |∼ G then for all formulas h, F |∼ h iff F ∪G |∼ h. A straightforward translation of
F |∼ f into our situation is S |∼ f , where S is a plausible-structure. But then it is really
hard to know what F ∪G might mean. Essentially we are trying to add proved formulas
to S. But the only set of formulas in S is Fact(S). So we could try letting F ∪G be
(Fact(S)∪G,Plaus(S)). But this is only sensible when the formulas in G have been proved
using only Fact(S). When the formulas in G have been proved using Plaus(S) then it is
no longer sensible to treat the formulas in G as facts; because they are not facts, they are
only plausible conclusions.
Some of the principles of plausible reasoning are regarded as necessary and so use the
word ‘must’; the other principles are regarded as desirable and so use the word ‘should’.
As well as the principles of plausible reasoning, we shall present several plausible-
reasoning examples. Some of these examples are based on an n-lottery, that is, randomly
selecting a number from the finite integer interval [1..n]. We shall use si to denote that the
number i was selected. Four examples will guide the development of some of the principles,
and so we shall call these examples signpost examples. Our first signpost example is the
3-lottery example.
Example 3.1 (The 3-lottery example). Consider a 3-lottery. Then we have the following.
1) Exactly one element of {s1, s2, s3} is true.
2) Each element of {s1, s2, s3} is probably false.
3) The disjunction of any 2 elements of {s1, s2, s3} is probably true.
This example illustrates some important properties of plausible reasoning that will be
considered in several of the following subsections.
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The following notation will be convenient. Let Thm(L, α,S) denote the set of all for-
mulas derivable from the plausible-structure S by using the proof algorithm α of the logic
L. If F is a set of propositional formulas then Thm(F ) denotes all the formulas derivable
from F by (the proof algorithm of) any classical propositional logic. This simpler notation
is unambiguous because Thm(F ) is independent of the logic (for example Hilbert systems,
natural deduction, or resolution systems) and its proof algorithm.
3.1 Representation
Plausible-reasoning situations may contain facts as well as plausible information; for in-
stance statement (1) of Example 3.1 is a factual statement, unlike the other two statements
which are plausible. Hence the first part of our first principle of plausible reasoning.
Although the inherent lack of precision of plausible-reasoning situations is not quantified,
a logic could represent this lack of precision with undue accuracy, for instance by using
probabilities. Forbidding this is too restrictive, as the logic may deduce a conclusion using
the probabilities but then present that conclusion without using probabilities. All we need
is that the conclusions are not unduly precise. In particular if a formula is proved by using
plausible information then it should not be regard as a fact. Hence the second part of our
first principle of plausible reasoning.
Principle 3.1 (The Representation Principle).
1) A logic for plausible reasoning must be able to represent, and distinguish between, factual
and plausible statements.
2) The formulas proved by a logic for plausible reasoning must not be more precise than
the information used to derive them.
We note that when a situation is precisely described, perhaps using probabilities, a logic
for plausible reasoning should be able to reason with the corresponding imprecisely defined
situation; Example 3.1 is such a situation.
We infer from Principle 3.1(1) that we should be able to distinguish between conclusions
that are factual and those that are merely plausible. One way of making this distinction is
to have a factual proof algorithm that only uses facts and deduces only facts, and also
a plausible proof algorithm that may use plausible statements and facts and deduces
formulas that are only plausible. Of course if a plausible proof algorithm deduces only
facts when given just facts then it can be regarded as both a factual and a plausible proof
algorithm. The need for multiple proof algorithms is discussed further in Subsection 3.8.
3.2 Evidence and Non-Monotonicity
Let us now see if we can establish some general guidelines concerning the provability of a
given formula f . A plausible-reasoning situation will have evidence for and against f . So
it seems reasonable to determine whether f is provable or not by just comparing these two
sets of evidence, and declaring f provable iff the preponderance of evidence is for f .
A consequence of the evidence criterion needs the following definitions. If S1 and S2 are
plausible-structures then S1⊆S2 means Fact(S1)⊆Fact(S2) and Plaus(S1)⊆Plaus(S2).
A proof algorithm α of a logic L is said to bemonotonic iff for any two plausible-structures,
S1 and S2, if S1⊆S2 then Thm(L, α,S1)⊆Thm(L, α,S2). For example, the proof algorithm
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of a classical propositional logic is monotonic. A proof algorithm is non-monotonic iff it
is not monotonic. A plausible proof algorithm is non-monotonic because the addition of
evidence against a previously provable formula can cause it to be unprovable, as shown in
our second signpost example.
Example 3.2 (The Non-Monotonicity example). Consider the following two statements.
The first is plausible and the second is factual.
1) a is probably true.
2) ¬a is (definitely) true.
From (1) the conclusion is ‘a is plausible’. From (1) and (2), ‘a is plausible’ cannot be
deduced, but ‘¬a is true’ can be.
The discussion above justifies our next principle.
Principle 3.2.
3.2.1) The Evidence Principle.
A plausible proof algorithm can prove a formula f iff all the evidence for f
sufficiently outweighs all the evidence against f .
3.2.2) The Non-Monotonicity Principle.
A plausible proof algorithm must be non-monotonic.
Exactly what constitutes evidence for or against f can only be determined when the
particular logic for plausible reasoning is known. Also ‘sufficiently outweighs’ depends on
the intuition that is being modelled, as well as the particular logic.
A proof algorithm that fails the Evidence Principle seems to be seriously flawed. So the
Evidence Principle may be a principle that any sensible proof algorithm should satisfy.
3.3 Conjunction
We shall say a proof algorithm α of a logic L is conjunctive iff for any plausible-structure,
S, and any two formulas f and g, if {f, g} ⊆Thm(L, α,S) then
∧
{f, g} ∈Thm(L, α,S).
For example, the proof algorithm of any classical propositional logic is conjunctive. A proof
algorithm is non-conjunctive iff it is not conjunctive.
Conjunctions of plausible formulas behave very differently from conjunctions of formulas
that are certain. In Example 3.1,
∧
{¬s1,¬s2} is equivalent to s3. So although ¬s1 is plau-
sible and ¬s2 is plausible,
∧
{¬s1,¬s2} is not plausible. Clearly plausible proof algorithms
are not conjunctive.
Although the conjunction of two plausible formulas is not necessarily plausible, the
conjunction of two facts is a fact. So what about the conjunction of a fact and a plausible
formula? Clearly it cannot be a fact, but is it always plausible? Intuitively, a fact f is always
true, and a plausible formula g is true more often that not. So it seems reasonable that
their conjunction be true whenever g is true, and hence it is reasonable that the conjunction
is plausible. After we account for explosiveness and the problem of tautologies we get the
following definition. We shall say a proof algorithm α of a logic L is plausibly conjunctive
iff for any plausible-structure, S, and any two formulas f and g, if f ∈From(Fact(S)) and
g ∈ Thm(L, α,S) then
∧
{f, g} ∈ Thm(L, α,S). For example, the proof algorithm of any
classical propositional logic is plausibly conjunctive.
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Principle 3.3 (Conjunction).
3.3.1) The Non-Conjunction Principle.
A plausible proof algorithm must not be conjunctive.
3.3.2) The Plausible Conjunction Principle.
A plausible proof algorithm should be plausibly conjunctive.
The Non-Conjunction Principle is supported by the fact that the ‘And’ rule of (Kraus
et al., 1990), (If a |∼ x and a |∼ y then a |∼
∧
{x, y}.), is not probabilistically sound, see
(Makinson & Hawthorne, 2014)(Section 2.1) where they call the ‘And’ rule the ‘Right∧+’
rule. Also Definition 2.4 of (Hawthorne & Makinson, 2007) defines an ‘And’ rule that is
probabilistically sound and has a similar intuition to our Plausible Conjunction Principle.
3.4 Disjunction
We shall say a proof algorithm α of a logic L is disjunctive iff for any plausible-structure,
S, and any two formulas f and g, if
∨
{f, g}∈Thm(L, α,S) then either f ∈Thm(L, α,S)
or g ∈Thm(L, α,S). A proof algorithm is non-disjunctive iff it is not disjunctive. The
proof algorithm of any classical propositional logic is non-disjunctive.
The 3-lottery example (Example 3.1) shows that, although s1 and s2 are both unlikely
their disjunction
∨
{s1, s2} is likely. Hence our next principle is necessary.
Principle 3.4 (The Non-Disjunction Principle).
A plausible proof algorithm must not be disjunctive.
3.5 Supraclassicality
Consider a plausible-structure S. Let α be a plausible proof algorithm of the logic L. Then
it is tempting to suggest that Thm(Fact(S)) ⊆ Thm(L, α,S). This is called supraclassi-
cality, and could be phrased as ‘what is true is usually true’.
As we saw in Section 2 after Definition 2.7, classical propositional logic is explosive and
proves all tautologies. But we do not want to force logics for plausible reasoning to be
explosive or to prove all tautologies.
Definition 3.1. A proof algorithm α of a logic L has the plausible supraclassicality
property and is said to be plausibly supraclassical iff for any plausible-structure, S,
From(Fact(S)) ⊆ Thm(L, α,S).
Principle 3.5 (The Plausible Supraclassicality Principle).
Factual and plausible proof algorithms should be plausibly supraclassical.
Since From(Fact(S)) ⊆ Thm(Fact(S)), if α is supraclassical (that is, Thm(Fact(S)) ⊆
Thm(L, α,S)) then it is plausibly supraclassical.
3.6 Right Weakening
Right Weakening can be thought of as closure under classical inference. More precisely, a
proof algorithm α has the right weakening property iff for any plausible-structure, S,
and any formula f , if f ∈Thm(L, α,S) and f |= g then g∈Thm(L, α,S). By replacing g
with any tautology, we see that a consequence of the right weakening property is Taut ⊆
9
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Thm(L, α,S). But we do not want to force logics for plausible reasoning to prove all
tautologies. We say a proof algorithm α has the weak right weakening property iff
for any plausible-structure, S, and any formula f , if f ∈Thm(L, α,S) then From({f}) ⊆
Thm(L, α,S).
However, suppose that whenever the facts of the plausible-structure S and a formula f
are true then the formula g is also true; in symbols Fact(S)∪{f} |= g. Then in the situation
defined by S, g is true at least as often as f . So if f is usually true then g should also be
usually true. We say a proof algorithm α has the strong right weakening property iff for
any plausible-structure, S, and any formula f , if f ∈Thm(L, α,S) and Fact(S)∪{f} |= g
then g∈Thm(L, α,S).
Combining the ideas in the preceding two paragraphs produces the following defini-
tion and corresponding principle. A proof algorithm α of a logic L has the plausible
right weakening property iff for any plausible-structure, S, and any formula f , if
f ∈Thm(L, α,S) then From(Fact(S)∪{f}) ⊆ Thm(L, α,S).
Principle 3.6 (The Plausible Right Weakening Principle).
A plausible proof algorithm should have the plausible right weakening property.
We note that strong right weakening implies all the other right weakening properties,
and weak right weakening is implied by all the other right weakening properties.
3.7 Consistency
Of the 11 characteristics of plausible reasoning given on page 114 of (Walton et al., 2014),
characteristic 8 is ‘stability’; which seems to mean (bottom of page 97 of (Walton et al.,
2014)) that plausible statements are consistent. However, as we shall show, where consis-
tency is concerned the number of plausible statements is important.
We say a proof algorithm α of a logic L is n-consistent iff for any plausible-structure,
S, and any set of formulas, F , if Fact(S) is satisfiable, and F ⊆Thm(L, α,S), and |F | ≤ n
then F is satisfiable. Also a proof algorithm α of a logic L is strongly n-consistent iff
for any plausible-structure, S, and any set of formulas, F , if Fact(S) is satisfiable, and
F ⊆Thm(L, α,S), and |F | ≤ n then Fact(S)∪F is satisfiable.
So if a proof algorithm is strongly n-consistent then it is n-consistent. If Fact(S) is
satisfiable then Thm(Fact(S)) is satisfiable; else Thm(Fact(S)) contains all formulas.
Contradictions are not plausible, so plausible proof algorithms must be 1-consistent.
Hence Principle 3.7.1 below.
Suppose S is a plausible-structure such that Fact(S) is satisfiable. If f ∈Thm(L, α,S)
then in the situation defined by S, f is more likely to be true than not. Hence we should
expect Fact(S)∪{f} to be satisfiable. That is, strong 1-consistency should hold.
Now consider strong 2-consistency. So suppose f and g are formulas such that {f, g}⊆
Thm(L, α,S). By strong 1-consistency, both Fact(S)∪{f} and Fact(S)∪{g} should be
satisfiable. If Fact(S)∪{f, g} is unsatisfiable then Fact(S)∪{g} |= ¬f . If f and g are
contingent then the strong right weakening property is reasonable, and so we should expect
that ¬f ∈Thm(L, α,S). Thus we have {f,¬f}⊆Thm(L, α,S). But, a reasonable property
of ‘likely’ is that for any formula f , at most one of f and ¬f is likely. Therefore we
should not have {f,¬f} ⊆ Thm(L, α,S). This unsatisfactory situation can be avoided if
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Fact(S)∪{f, g} is satisfiable. So plausible proof algorithms should be strongly 2-consistent.
Hence Principle 3.7.2 below.
Consider the 3-lottery example (Example 3.1) and let U = {¬s1,¬s2,
∨
{s1, s2}}. For
each x in U , x is likely; and ¬x is not likely. But U is (classically) unsatisfiable. The set U
shows the necessity of Principle 3.7.3 below.
Principle 3.7 (Consistency).
3.7.1) The 1-Consistency Principle.
A plausible proof algorithm must be 1-consistent.
3.7.2) The Strong 2-Consistency Principle.
A plausible proof algorithm should be strongly 2-consistent.
3.7.3) The Non-3-Consistency Principle.
A plausible proof algorithm that can prove disjunctions must not be 3-consistent.
3.8 Multiple Intuitions: Ambiguity
With the possible exception of tautologies, classical propositional logic captures our in-
tuition about what follows from a satisfiable set of facts. But there are different well-
informed intuitions about what follows from a plausible-reasoning situation. For example,
as early as 1987 (Section 4.1 of (Touretzky, Horty, & Thomason, 1987)) it was recognised
that a plausible-reasoning situation could elicit different sensible conclusions, depending on
whether ambiguity was blocked or propagated. The essence of Figure 3 in (Touretzky et al.,
1987) is our third signpost example.
Example 3.3 (The Ambiguity Puzzle).
1) There is evidence that a is likely.
2) There is evidence that ¬a is likely.
3) There is evidence that b is likely.
4) If a then ¬b is likely.
What can be concluded about b? The evidence for b is (3). The evidence against b
comes from (1) and (4). If we knew that a was definitely true then the evidence for b and
against b would be equal. Ignoring (2), a is only likely by (1), so the evidence against b is
weaker than the evidence for b. But (2) means that a is even less likely, and so the evidence
against b has been further weakened. Thus b is more likely than ¬b. Hence many people
think that it is reasonable to be able to conclude b. Such reasoning might be called ‘best
bet’ or ‘most likely’ or ‘balance of probabilities’ reasoning.
A formula f is said to be ambiguous iff there is evidence for f and there is evidence
against f and neither f nor ¬f can be proved. Since (1) and (2) give equal evidence for
and against a, a is ambiguous.
If the evidence against b has been weakened sufficiently to allow b to be concluded, then
b is not ambiguous. So the ambiguity of a has been blocked from propagating to b. An
algorithm that can prove b (but not ¬b) is said to be ambiguity blocking. This level of
reasoning is appropriate if the benefit of being right outweighs the penalty for being wrong.
If the evidence against b has not been weakened sufficiently to allow b to be concluded,
then b is ambiguous. So the ambiguity of a has been propagated to b. An algorithm that
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cannot prove b (or ¬b) is said to be ambiguity propagating. This more cautious level of
reasoning is appropriate if the penalty for being wrong outweighs the benefit of being right.
It is well-known that the Anglo-American legal system uses a hierarchy of proof levels,
two of which are the ‘balance of probabilities’ or ‘preponderance of the evidence’ (used in
civil cases) which is ambiguity blocking, and ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ (used in criminal
cases) which is ambiguity propagating. So there is a need for a proof algorithm that blocks
ambiguity and one that propagates ambiguity.
To avoid confusion, one should know which algorithm is used; unless it is irrelevant to
the point being made. This, and our observation at the beginning of this section that a logic
for plausible reasoning should have a factual proof algorithm, leads to our next principle.
Principle 3.8 (The Many Proof Algorithms Principle).
A logic for plausible reasoning should have at least
1) a factual proof algorithm,
2) an ambiguity blocking plausible proof algorithm, and
3) an ambiguity propagating plausible proof algorithm.
Also, the proof algorithm used to prove a formula should be explicit or irrelevant.
Clearly the algorithms in (2) and (3) must be different. But, as indicated after Principle
3.1, the factual algorithm could be the same as a plausible algorithm.
3.9 Decisiveness
For a formula, f , a proof algorithm, α, will satisfy exactly one of the following conditions.
i) α does not terminate.
ii) α terminates in a state indicating that f is proved,
iii) α terminates in a state indicating that f is not provable,
iv) α terminates in some other state.
A proof algorithm α is said to be decisive iff for every formula f , α terminates in either a
state indicating that f is proved, or a state indicating that f is not provable.
Our next principle is clearly desirable.
Principle 3.9 (The Decisiveness Principle).
Factual and plausible proof algorithms should be decisive.
3.10 Truth Values
Let us change our focus from deduction to the more semantic notion of assigning truth
values to statements. For classical propositional logic there are exactly two truth values: T
for true and F for false. If v is a valuation (that is a function from the set of formulas to
the set of truth values) and f and g are formulas then
1) Either v(f) = T or v(¬f) = T but not both, (the Excluded Middle property) and
2) v(
∧
{f, g}) = T iff v(f) = T = v(g), and
3) v(
∨
{f, g}) = T iff v(f) = T or v(g) = T.
The 3-lottery example (Example 3.1) shows that the closest plausible reasoning can get
to (2) and (3) is (4) and (5) below.
4) If v(
∧
{f, g}) = T then v(f) = T = v(g).
5) If v(f) = T or v(g) = T then v(
∨
{f, g}) = T.
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Moreover consider our fourth signpost example.
Example 3.4 (The 4-lottery example). Consider a 4-lottery. Then we have the following.
1) Exactly one element of {s1, s2, s3, s4} is true.
2) Each element of {s1, s2, s3, s4} is probably false.
3) The disjunction of any 2 of elements of {s1, s2, s3, s4} is not probably true and not
probably false.
4) The disjunction of any 3 elements of {s1, s2, s3, s4} is probably true.
Intuitively some formulas concerning Example 3.4 have different truth values; for ex-
ample
∨
{s1, s2, s3, s4} is definitely true, ¬
∨
{s1, s2, s3, s4} is definitely false, ¬s1 is probably
true, s1 is probably false, and
∨
{s1, s2} is as likely to be true as false. So plausible reasoning
appears to need at least 3 truth values:
one indicating that a formula is more likely to be true than false,
one indicating that a formula is as likely to be true as false, and
one indicating that a formula is more likely to be false than true.
Hence our last principle of plausible reasoning.
Principle 3.10 (The Included Middle Principle).
A logic for plausible reasoning should have at least 3 truth values.
But what happens if we insist on there being exactly two truth values? Suppose a logic
L for plausible reasoning has exactly 2 truth values, T and F. Also suppose that for any
formulas f , g, and h, the following truth conditions hold.
TC1) If f is more likely to be true than false
then f and ¬f have different truth values.
TC2) If f is as likely to be true as false
then f and ¬f have the same truth value.
TC3) The truth value of
∨
{f, g, h} is T iff the truth value of at least one of f , g, or h is T.
TC4) ¬
∨
{f, g, h} and
∧
{¬f,¬g,¬h} have the same truth value.
TC5) The truth value of
∧
{f, g, h} is T iff the truth value of each one of f , g, and h is T.
Now apply L to Example 3.4. By TC1, for each i in {1, 2, 3}, si and ¬si have different
truth values. By TC2,
∨
{s1, s2, s3} and ¬
∨
{s1, s2, s3} have the same truth value, which
by TC4 is the same as
∧
{¬s1,¬s2,¬s3}.
If the truth value of
∨
{s1, s2, s3} is T then by TC3, for some i, the truth value of si is
T; hence the truth value of ¬si is F and so by TC5 the truth value of
∧
{¬s1,¬s2,¬s3} is
F. On the other hand if the truth value of
∨
{s1, s2, s3} is F then by TC3, for each i, the
truth value of si is F; hence the truth value of each ¬si is T and so by TC5 the truth value
of
∧
{¬s1,¬s2,¬s3} is T.
So in both cases
∨
{s1, s2, s3} and
∧
{¬s1,¬s2,¬s3} have different truth values which
contradicts what we had before.
The conditions TC1, TC2, TC3, TC4, and TC5 are so closely related to the meaning
of ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘conjunction’, ‘disjunction’, and ‘negation’, that it is hard to reject any of
them. Therefore it seems that having only two truth values is an over-simplification.
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3.11 Correctness
A logic that satisfies all the previous principles could nonetheless have a fatal flaw. It could
give an unsatisfactory answer to a particular example. Some examples may well have no
set of answers that are generally agreed upon. But some examples do have a set of answers
that are generally agreed upon. We might call these answers the correct answers. So it is
tempting to state a principle of correctness similar to “When correct answers exist, a logic
must give all the correct answers, and no incorrect answers.”.
The problem with such a principle is that it is impossible to show that any logic satisfies
it. The most that can be done is to produce an counter-example that shows a logic fails
the principle, or demonstrate that for a chosen set of examples the logic gets the correct
answers. But there might exist a counter-example that shows the logic fails the principle of
correctness.
Thus we shall refrain from trying to formally state a Correctness Principle.
4. Some Non-Monotonic Logics
We shall consider the relationship between some (non-numeric) non-monotonic logics and
the principles and examples of Section 3.
There are three well-known non-monotonic logics, namely Default Logic, Circumscrip-
tion, and Autoepistemic Logic; see (Antoniou, 1997) for an introduction. Answer Set Pro-
gramming (ASP) (Baral, 2003) is a well-known Knowledge Representation system.
Each of the proof algorithms of these four well-known systems is conjunctive and so
fails the Non-Conjunction Principle (Principle 3.3.1). Also for each of these four proof
algorithms, the set of all provable formulas is either satisfiable or contains all formulas. So
all four proof algorithms fail the Non-3-Consistency Principle (Principle 3.7.3). Hence none
of these logics reasons correctly about the 3-lottery example (Example 3.1). Finally all
four of these proof algorithms are ambiguity propagating but not ambiguity blocking. So
each of these logics fails the Many Proof Algorithms Principle (Principle 3.8). Hence when
ambiguity blocking is required — for instance in civil cases — these logics do not get the
right answers.
Logics that deal with only literals are incapable of the reasoning required by Example 3.1.
Logics in this category include inheritance networks (Horty, Thomason, & Touretzky, 1990),
the DeLP system of (Garcia & Simari, 2004), the ASPIC system mentioned in (Caminada
& Amgoud, 2007), the logic in (Prakken & Sartor, 1997), Ordered logic (Geerts, Vermeir,
& Nute, 1994), and most Defeasible Logics (Billington, 2008).
Propositional Plausible Logic (PPL), which is defined in the next section, is a member
of the family of Defeasible Logics. The only Defeasible Logics that deal with conjunction
and disjunction, besides PPL, are the logic in (Billington & Rock, 2001), let’s call it DL1,
and the logic in (Billington, 2008), let’s call it DL8. But the plausible proof algorithms of
both DL1 and DL8 are conjunctive and so do not satisfy the Non-Conjunction Principle
(Principle 3.3.1). Also the Decisiveness Principle (Principle 3.9) fails for the plausible
proof algorithms that define the Defeasible Logics in: (Billington, 1993), (Billington &
Rock, 2001), (Maier & Nute, 2006), (Billington, 2008), and (Billington, 2011). Since all
Defeasible Logics apart from PPL are closely related to a Defeasible Logic in these five
citations, all Defeasible Logics apart from PPL fail the Decisiveness Principle. So PPL is
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the only Defeasible Logic that satisfies all the principles in Section 3. Also PPL is more
expressive than previous Defeasible Logics because the non-strict rules in PPL use formulas
whereas previous Defeasible Logics only used literals and clauses. This is significant because
a finite set of clauses is very different to the conjunction of those clauses, see the 3-lottery
example (Example 3.1).
Argumentation systems, (Dung, 1995), are well-known non-monotonic reasoning systems
that can use rules, for example ASPIC (Caminada & Amgoud, 2007) and ASPIC+ (Modgil
& Prakken, 2013). Let E ∈{admissible, complete, preferred, grounded, ideal, semi-stable,
stable}. Then the semantics of ASPIC+ defined by intersecting all E-extensions is ambiguity
propagating and so fails the Many Proof Algorithms Principle (Principle 3.8(2)).
An early argumentation system is given in (Simari & Loui, 1992) and it also is ambiguity
propagating and so fails the Many Proof Algorithms Principle (Principle 3.8(2)). It also
has other problems mentioned in (Geerts, Laenens, & Vermier, 1998).
Three postulates that a rule-based argumentation system should satisfy are given in
(Caminada & Amgoud, 2007). Postulate 1 is closure under strict rules; that is Modus Ponens
for strict rules (Theorem 7.3(3)). It is a kind of right weakening property (Subsection 3.6).
Postulate 2 requires the set of all proved literals to be consistent. If only literals can be
proved, as in (Caminada & Amgoud, 2007), then this is implied by the Strong 2-Consistency
Principle (Principle 2). Postulates 1 and 2 jointly imply Postulate 3.
It is not surprising that Conditional Logics (Nute & Cross, 2001; Arlo-Costa & Egre´,
2016) have been used to analyse non-monotonic reasoning. Let 99K denote a weak condi-
tional; so that for formulas f and g, f 99K g means ‘if f then ... g’ where ‘...’ could be
‘normally’, ‘typically’, ‘probably’, or any other similar word or phrase. A set of such weak
conditionals is called a ‘conditional knowledge base’. The following two rules are particularly
important for differentiating our plausible reasoning from other kinds of reasoning.
And: If f 99K g and f 99K h then f 99K
∧
{g, h}.
Or: If f 99K h and g 99K h then
∨
{f, g} 99K h.
The And-rule is also called the CC-rule, and the Or-rule is also called the CA-rule.
Let Ax3 =
∧
{
∨
{s1, s2, s3}, ¬
∧
{s1, s2}, ¬
∧
{s1, s3}, ¬
∧
{s2, s3}} be the formula that
characterises the 3-lottery example, Example 3.1(1) As noted in Subsection 3.3, we have
Ax3 99K ¬s1 and Ax3 99K ¬s2 but not Ax3 99K
∧
{¬s1,¬s2}. So reasoning systems that
satisfy the And-rule do not do plausible reasoning.
The formula, Ax7, that characterises a 7-lottery is the conjunction of the following
22 formulas:
∨
{s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7} and ¬
∧
{si, sj}, where 1 ≤ i < j ≤ 7. Let f be∧
{Ax7,¬s1,¬s2}, let g be
∧
{Ax7,¬s3,¬s4}, and let h be
∨
{s5, s6, s7}. Then f is equivalent
to exactly one of s3 or s4 or s5 or s6 or s7, and g is equivalent to exactly one of s1 or s2 or s5
or s6 or s7. So f 99K h and g 99K h. But
∨
{f, g} does not restrict the selected number at
all, and h is not the usual result of a 7-lottery. So we do not have
∨
{f, g} 99K h. Therefore
reasoning systems that satisfy the Or-rule do not do plausible reasoning.
In (Delgrande, 2007) it is observed that the following reasoning systems satisfy both
the And-rule and the Or-rule and hence do not do our plausible reasoning: systems based
on intuitions from probability theory such as (Adams, 1975) and (Pearl, 1988), and from
qualitative possibilistic logic (Dubois, Lang, & Prade, 1994), those based on C4 (Lamarre,
1991), CT4 (Boutilier, 1994a), and S (Burgess, 1981).
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Geffner and Pearl (Geffner & Pearl, 1992) define a logic called ‘conditional entailment’.
The second paragraph on page 235 of (Geffner & Pearl, 1992) contains the following sen-
tence. “In the propositional case, the only difference between conditional entailment and
prioritized circumscription is the source of the priorities: while prioritized circumscription
relies on the user, conditional entailment extracts the priorities from the knowledge base it-
self.” As noted near the beginning of this section, circumscription fails the Non-Conjunction
Principle (Principle 3.3.1), the Non-3-Consistency Principle (Principle 3.7.3), and the Many
Proof Algorithms Principle (Principle 3.8). Hence conditional entailment also fails these
principles.
The consequence function of (Makinson, 1988) and the cumulative conditional knowl-
edge bases of (Kraus et al., 1990) satisfy both the And-rule and the Or-rule. Preferential
conditional knowledge bases (Kraus et al., 1990) are cumulative. Rational conditional
knowledge bases (Lehmann & Magidor, 1992) are preferential. Hence both the preferential
and rational closure of a conditional knowledge base satisfies both the And-rule and the
Or-rule; and so does not do the plausible reasoning we are trying to characterise.
As noted in (Delgrande, 2007) the following systems are ‘essentially the same as’ rational
closure and hence do not do our plausible reasoning: System Z (Pearl, 1990), systems
based on conditional logic (Crocco & Lamarre, 1992), on modal logic (Boutilier, 1994b), on
possibilistic logic (Benferhat, Dubois, & Prade, 1992), and on conditional objects (Dubois
& Prade, 1991).
The Propositional Typicality Logic (PTL) of (Booth, Meyer, & Varzinczak, 2013) and
(Booth, Casini, Meyer, & Varzinczak, 2015) has several semantics. Each semantics is at
least preferential and so satisfies both the And-rule and the Or-rule. Hence PTL does not
do the plausible reasoning we are trying to characterise.
The conditional logic C of (Delgrande, 2007) does not satisfy the Plausible Right Weak-
ening Principle (Principle 3.6). Also C and the extensions of C considered in (Delgrande,
2007) have only one proof algorithm and so fail the Many Proof Algorithms Principle (Prin-
ciple 3.8).
Apart from the problems mentioned in Section 5 of (Goldszmidt & Pearl, 1991), System
Z (Pearl, 1990) and System Z+ (Goldszmidt & Pearl, 1991) are ambiguity propagating but
not ambiguity blocking. Hence they fail the Many Proof Algorithms Principle (Principle
3.8). Moreover, although they can represent the 3-lottery example (Example 3.1), they
cannot prove anything about the example because the set of rules is not ‘consistent’ as
defined in (Pearl, 1990; Goldszmidt & Pearl, 1991).
The logic implemented by theorist (Poole, 1988) and the Preferred Subtheories logic
in (Brewka, 1989) both generate consistent extensions and so fail the Non-3-Consistency
Principle (Principle 3.7.3).
Every logic reviewed above fails at least one of the following principles: the Non-
Conjunction Principle (Principle 3.3.1), the Non-3-Consistency Principle (Principle 3.7.3),
the Many Proof Algorithms Principle (Principle 3.8), and the correctness principle as in-
stanced by the 3-lottery example (Example 3.1). So these principles seem to be central to
the difference between the plausible reasoning characterised in Section 3 and other kinds of
non-numeric non-monotonic reasoning. As far as we know, Propositional Plausible Logic
is the only non-numeric non-monotonic propositionally adequate logic that satisfies all the
principles in Section 3.
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5. Propositional Plausible Logic (PPL)
The purpose of this section is to define a propositional logic, called Propositional Plausible
Logic (PPL), that satisfies all the principles in Section 3. The plausible-structure used
in PPL is defined in Subsection 5.1. The proof algorithms are defined in Subsection 5.2.
The notions of ‘proof’ and ‘truth’ are developed in Subsection 5.3 and Subsection 5.4,
respectively.
As well as the notation introduced in Section 2, we shall use the following notation
concerning sequences. The empty sequence is denoted by (). Let S be a sequence. If S
is finite then S+e denotes the sequence formed by just adding e onto the right end of S.
Define e∈S to mean e is an element of S, and e /∈S to mean e is not an element of S.
5.1 Plausible Descriptions
Propositional Plausible Logic (PPL) reasons about plausible-reasoning situations that may
contain facts, like definitions and membership of categories. These facts are represented by
formulas that are converted into clauses called axioms and these axioms are then converted
into strict rules. The plausible information is represented by defeasible rules, warning rules,
and a priority relation, >, on rules.
Intuitively the various kinds of rules have the following meanings. The strict rule A→c
means if every formula in A is true then c is true. So strict rules are like material implication
except that A is a finite set of formulas rather than a single formula. (We have already
seen that A and
∧
A behave differently.) For example, ‘nautiluses are cephalopods’ could
be written as {n}→c, and ‘cephalopods are molluscs’ could be written as {c}→m.
Roughly, the defeasible rule A⇒ c means if every formula in A is true then c is usu-
ally true. For example, ‘molluscs usually have shells’ could be written as {m} ⇒ s, and
‘cephalopods usually have no shells’ could be written as {c}⇒¬s.
The warning rule A❀ c roughly means if every formula in A is true then c might be
true. So A❀¬c warns against concluding usually c, but does not support usually ¬c. For
example, ‘objects that look red in red light might not be red’ could be written as {looks-red-
in-red-light}❀¬r. Warning rules can be used to prevent unwanted chaining. For example,
suppose we have ‘if a then usually b’ ({a} ⇒ b) and ‘if b then usually c’ ({b}⇒ c). Then
it may be too risky to conclude ‘usually c’ from a. Without introducing evidence for ¬c,
the conclusion of ‘usually c’ from a can be prevented by the warning rule {a}❀ ¬c. An
instance of this example can be created by letting a be x ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, b be x ∈ {2, 3, 4},
and c be x∈{3, 4, 5}. Warning rules have also been called ‘defeaters’ and ‘interfering rules’.
The formal definition of a rule and its associated terms follows.
Definition 5.1. A rule, r, is any triple (A(r), arrow (r), c(r)) such that A(r), called the
set of antecedents of r, is a finite (possibly empty) set of formulas;
arrow (r)∈{→,⇒,❀}; and c(r), called the consequent of r, depends on arrow (r).
If arrow (r) is the strict arrow, →, then c(r) is either a formula or the conjunction of a
countable set of formulas, and r is written A(r)→ c(r) and called a strict rule.
If arrow (r) is the defeasible arrow, ⇒, then c(r) is a formula, and r is written
A(r)⇒ c(r) and called a defeasible rule.
If arrow (r) is the warning arrow, ❀, then c(r) is a formula, and r is written
A(r)❀ c(r) and called a warning rule.
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A priority relation, >, on rules is used to indicate the more relevant of two rules. For
instance, the specific rule ‘cephalopods usually have no shells’, ({c}⇒¬s), is more relevant
than the general rule ‘molluscs usually have shells’, ({m}⇒ s), when reasoning about the
external appearance of cephalopods. Hence {c}⇒¬s > {m}⇒ s. More generally, some
common policies for defining > are the following. Prefer specific rules over general rules;
prefer authoritative rules, (for instance national laws override state laws); prefer recent rules
(because they are more up-to-date); and prefer more reliable rules. If r and s are rules and
r > s then we often say r is superior to s and s is inferior to r.
Although the priority relation does not have to be transitive, it does have to be acyclic.
Definition 5.2. Let R be any set of rules. A binary relation, >, on R is cyclic iff there
exists a finite sequence, (r1, r2, ..., rn) where n ≥ 1, of elements of R such that r1 > r2 >
... > rn > r1; that is, rn > r1 and for all i in [1 .. n−1], ri > ri+1. A binary relation, >, is
acyclic iff it is not cyclic.
Let us now consider the conversion of the facts of a plausible-reasoning situation rep-
resented by a set F of formulas into strict rules. First we form Claus(F ) which is the
set of clauses formed from F . Next we generate the set of axioms, Ax by defining Ax =
CorRes(Sat(Claus(F ))). Finally we convert a contingent clause with n literals into 2n−1
strict rules. The conversion is done by the function Rul(.) in the usual way as shown by
the following example. Rul(
∨
{a, b, c}) = { {}→
∨
{a, b, c},
{
∧
{¬b,¬c}}→a, {
∧
{¬a,¬c}}→b, {
∧
{¬a,¬b}}→c,
{¬a}→
∨
{b, c}, {¬b}→
∨
{a, c}, {¬c}→
∨
{a, b} }.
The full definition of Rul(.) and Rul(., .), as well as some useful notation, is given in the
next definition.
Definition 5.3. Let R be a set of rules, F be a finite set of formulas, and C be a set of
contingent clauses.
1) Rs is the set of strict rules in R. That is, Rs = {r∈R : r is a strict rule}.
2) Rd is the set of defeasible rules in R. That is, Rd = {r∈R : r is a defeasible rule}.
3) c(R) is the set of consequents of the rules in R. That is, c(R) = {c(r) : r∈R}.
4) If c∈C then Rul(c) = { {}→c} ∪ { {
∧
∼(L−K)} →
∨
K : c =
∨
L and {}⊂K⊂L}.
5) Rul(C) =
⋃
{Rul(c) : c∈C}.
6) Rul(C,F ) is the set of rules in Rul(C) whose set of antecedents is F . That is,
Rul(C,F ) = {r∈Rul(C) : A(r) = F}.
We note that the set of antecedents of any strict rule formed by Rul(.) has at most one
element.
Although Rul(Ax ) gives us the strict rules that characterise the set F of facts we started
with, we can reduce the number of these strict rules by ‘anding’ all those that have the
same antecedent. For example, the ‘anding’ of {a}→c1, {a}→c2, and {a}→c3 is {a}→∧
{c1, c2, c3}. We now have the set of strict rules that we want. This set is formally defined
by PD2 below. The formal structure used for describing plausible-reasoning situations is
called a plausible description and is defined below.
Definition 5.4. If R is a set of rules then (R,>) is a plausible description iff PD1,
PD2, PD3, and PD4 all hold.
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PD1) There is a set F of formulas such that Ax (R) = CorRes(Sat(Claus(F ))).
Ax(R) is called the set of axioms of R and is usually denoted by Ax .
PD2) Rs = {A→ smp(
∧
c(Rul(Ax , A))) : A∈{A(r) : r∈Rul(Ax )}}.
PD3) If Ax 6={} then r denotes the strict rule {} →
∧
Ax .
PD4) > is a priority relation on R; that is, > ⊆ R×(R−{r}) and > is not cyclic.
Suppose (R,>) is a plausible description. Then Ax is empty iff Rs is empty. If Ax 6={}
then r∈Rs. If Rs is not empty we can extract Ax from the consequent of r. This shows
that Ax (R) is indeed dependent on R. Different strict rules in R have different sets of
antecedents, and no rule is superior (>) to r.
For PPL the plausible-structure is a plausible description (R,>) and the factual part is
Ax (R), which by PD2 is equivalent to the strict rules in R, Rs. The plausible part consists
of the non-strict rules in R and the priority relation >.
By Lemma A.2(6) (See Appendix A) and PD1, Ax is satisfiable. So in PPL we extend
the meaning of ‘fact’ from just being an element of Ax to a formula that is implied by Ax .
Explicitly, a formula f is said to be a fact iff Ax |=f .
5.2 The Proof Relation and the Proof Algorithms
In this subsection we define what it means for a formula to be proved from a plausible
description. We shall do this by defining a proof relation, |− , and various proof algorithms.
This complex task will be done by giving the overall strategy, and then progressively refining
this general plan until all the terms used have been defined.
Any method of demonstrating that Ax |= f will do as an algorithm for proving facts;
so there is no need to specify a particular one. Let our top level general plan for proving a
formula be the following.
Distinguish between proving facts and proving formulas that are not facts.
Lower case Greek letters will be used to denote the proof algorithms that will eventually
be defined. A general proof algorithm will be denoted by α (a for alpha and algorithm).
We shall use ϕ (f for phi and fact) to denote our factual proof algorithm. Until a further
refinement is needed we shall use the notation α |−f to denote that a formula f is proved
by the proof algorithm α.
Since facts are always true they are (at least) probably true. So we shall decree that
facts are provable by all proof algorithms. Thus we have the following.
All algorithms prove all facts. In symbols, if Ax |= f then α |− f .
The factual algorithm proves a formula iff it is a fact. In symbols, ϕ |− f iff Ax |= f .
Now consider formulas f that are not facts, that is, Ax 6|= f . To (plausibly) prove f we
need to do two things. First, establish some evidence for f . Second, defeat all the evidence
against f . This will satisfy the requirements of the Evidence Principle, Principle 3.2.1. So
our first refinement of the general plan is the following.
Refinement 5.1. Suppose (R,>) is a plausible description, Ax = Ax (R), and f is a
formula.
1) If Ax |= f then α |− f . Also ϕ |− f iff Ax |= f .
2) If Ax 6|= f and α 6= ϕ then α |− f iff (2.1) and (2.2) hold.
2.1) Establish some evidence for f .
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2.2) Defeat all the evidence against f .
In accordance with the intuitive meaning of the three kinds of rules given at the begin-
ning of this subsection, the evidence for f consists of strict or defeasible rules that have a
consequent that implies f . However since the axioms are always true, we can weaken this
to requiring that Ax∪{c(r)} implies f , provided that Ax∪{c(r)} is satisfiable. So if R′⊆R
it will be convenient to let
R′[f ] = {r∈R′ : Ax∪{c(r)} is satisfiable and Ax∪{c(r)} |= f}.
In the case of Refinement 5.1(2.1) we have Ax 6|= f and so r cannot support f . Hence the
following notation is convenient.
Rsd = (Rs∪Rd)− {r}.
So the evidence for f is all the rules in R that support f , that is Rsd[f ]. To establish some
evidence for f we must prove the set of antecedents of a rule supporting f . So we need to
find a rule r in Rsd[f ] and prove A(r).
But A(r) is a set of formulas, not a formula. By proving a finite set F of formulas we
shall mean proving every formula in F . In symbols, α |−F iff ∀f ∈F , α |− f . So if F is
empty we have α |− {}.
Collecting these ideas together gives our next refinement.
Refinement 5.2. Suppose (R,>) is a plausible description, Ax = Ax (R), and f is a
formula.
1) If F is a finite set of formulas then α |−F iff ∀f ∈F , α |− f .
2) If Ax |= f then α |− f . Also ϕ |− f iff Ax |= f .
3) If Ax 6|= f and α 6= ϕ then α |− f iff ∃r∈Rsd[f ] such that (3.1) and (3.2) hold.
3.1) α |−A(r).
3.2) Defeat all the evidence against f .
Each rule whose consequent implies ¬f is evidence against f . The set of such rules is
R[¬f ]. In Refinement 5.2(3) we have a rule r in Rsd[f ]. So any rule in R[¬f ] that is inferior
to r has already been defeated by r and hence need not be explicitly considered. This
reduces the set of evidence against f that must be considered to the set of rules in R[¬f ]
that are not inferior to r; in symbols, {s∈R[¬f ] : s 6< r}.
A rule s in {s∈R[¬f ] : s 6< r} is defeated either by team defeat or by disabling s. The
team of rules for f is Rsd[f ]. The rule s is defeated by team defeat iff there is a rule t in the
team of rules for f , Rsd[f ], such that t is superior to s, t > s, and the set of antecedents of
t, A(t), is proved α |−A(t). So if R′⊆R it will be convenient to let R′[f ; s] denote the set
of all rules in R′[f ] that are superior to s. In symbols,
R′[f ; s] = {t∈R′[f ] : t > s}.
Alternatively s is disabled iff the set of antecedents of s, A(s), cannot be proved, α 6|−A(s).
Three notations for useful sets of rules have been introduced, so their formal definition
is appropriate before our third refinement.
Definition 5.5. Suppose (R,>) is a plausible description, Ax = Ax (R), R′⊆R, f is a
formula, and s∈R.
1) Rsd = (Rs∪Rd)− {r}.
2) R′[f ] = {r∈R′ : Ax∪{c(r)} is satisfiable and Ax∪{c(r)} |= f}.
3) R′[f ; s] = {t∈R′[f ] : t > s}.
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Refinement 5.3. Suppose (R,>) is a plausible description, Ax = Ax (R), and f is a
formula.
1) If F is a finite set of formulas then α |−F iff ∀f ∈F , α |− f .
2) If Ax |= f then α |− f . Also ϕ |− f iff Ax |= f .
3) If Ax 6|= f and α 6= ϕ then α |− f iff ∃r∈Rsd[f ] such that (3.1) and (3.2) hold.
3.1) α |−A(r).
3.2) ∀s∈{s∈R[¬f ] : s 6< r} either
3.2.1) ∃t∈Rsd[f ; s] such that α |−A(t); or
3.2.2) α 6|−A(s).
Refinement 5.3 has no undefined terms, but unfortunately it has two failings. There
is only one plausible proof algorithm (denoted by α), and so the Many Proof Algorithms
Principle, Principle 3.8, fails. Also, a proof may get into a loop, and hence the Decisiveness
Principle, Principle 3.9, fails.
Before we consider looping, let us invent the other proof algorithms. The α in Refinement
5.3(3.2.2) evaluates evidence against f ; and this need not be the same α as in (3.1) and
(3.2.1) which evaluates evidence for f . To avoid confusion let us call the α in (3.2.2),
α′. Replacing α by α′ in (3.2.2) creates the need to decide what (α′)′ is. Let us simplify
(α′)′ to α′′. Some obvious choices are: α′′ = α, or α′′ = α′, or α′′ is some other proof
algorithm. The third choice postpones and complicates the choice that must eventually be
made. Experimentation shows that the second choice has some properties that we would
rather avoid. So we let α′′ = α.
Another change that can be made is to the set {s ∈ R[¬f ] : s 6< r} of rules that a
proof algorithm regards as evidence against f . Let Foe(α, f, r) denote the set of rules that
α regards as the evidence against f that is not inferior to r.
These ideas gives us our fourth refinement.
Refinement 5.4. Suppose (R,>) is a plausible description, Ax = Ax (R), and f is a
formula.
1) If F is a finite set of formulas then α |−F iff ∀f ∈F , α |− f .
2) If Ax |= f then α |− f . Also ϕ |− f iff Ax |= f .
3) If Ax 6|= f and α 6= ϕ then α |− f iff ∃r∈Rsd[f ] such that (3.1) and (3.2) hold.
3.1) α |−A(r).
3.2) ∀s∈Foe(α, f, r) either
3.2.1) ∃t∈Rsd[f ; s] such that α |−A(t); or
3.2.2) α′ 6|−A(s).
Let us create our first non-factual proof algorithm, β, by changing Refinement 5.4 as
little as possible. So let Foe(β, f, r) = {s∈R[¬f ] : s 6< r}. Let β be defined by replacing
each α in Refinement 5.4 with β. Of course now β′ must be defined. First let Foe(β′, f, r) =
{s∈R[¬f ] : s 6< r}. Then let β′ be defined by replacing each α in Refinement 5.4 with β′.
(Recall that β′′ = β.) Later we shall show that β is ambiguity blocking (b for beta and
blocking). We are not really concerned with any primed algorithm as they only assist with
the definition of their non-primed co-algorithm. But later we shall show that β and β′ prove
exactly the same formulas. So why is β′ needed? Without β′ it is exceedingly difficult to
prove the relationship between β and the other algorithms we are about to define.
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Our next algorithm, pi, will be shown to be ambiguity propagating (p for pi and propa-
gating). We want to make pi as strong as possible; that is, pi proves f if there is no evidence
against f . This can be done by making its co-algorithm pi′ as weak as possible; that is, pi′
ignores all evidence against f ; hence Foe(pi′, f, r) = {}. This is the only change we make
to Refinement 5.4. Explicitly, let Foe(pi, f, r) = {s ∈ R[¬f ] : s 6< r}. Let pi be defined
by replacing each α in Refinement 5.4 with pi. Let pi′ be defined by replacing each α in
Refinement 5.4 with pi′. (Recall that pi′′ = pi.)
Our last algorithm, ψ, will also be shown to be ambiguity propagating (p for psi and
propagating). We want to make ψ weaker than pi. This can be done by making its co-
algorithm ψ′ regard those rules that imply ¬f and are superior to r as evidence against f ;
hence Foe(ψ′, f, r) = {s∈R[¬f ] : s > r}. This is the only change we make to Refinement
5.4. Explicitly, let Foe(ψ, f, r) = {s∈R[¬f ] : s 6< r}. Let ψ be defined by replacing each α
in Refinement 5.4 with ψ. Let ψ′ be defined by replacing each α in Refinement 5.4 with ψ′.
(Recall that ψ′′ = ψ.)
To emphasise that we are only interested in the non-primed proof algorithms we note
that there are examples in which both pi′ and ψ′ can prove both f and ¬f . This is fine
as both pi′ and ψ′ only assess the evidence against f , rather than try to defeasibly justify
accepting f , as the non-primed algorithms do.
The following two formal definitions collect together for easy reference the above nota-
tions concerning algorithms and Foe(., ., .).
Definition 5.6. Define the set, Alg, of names of the proof algorithms by
Alg = {ϕ, pi, ψ, β, β′, ψ′, pi′}. Define ϕ′ = ϕ. If α∈{pi, ψ, β} then define (α′)′ = α′′ = α. If
α∈Alg then the co-algorithm of α is α′.
Definition 5.7. Suppose (R,>) is a plausible description, f is a formula, and r∈R.
1) If α∈{pi, ψ, β, β′} and r 6= r then Foe(α, f, r) = {s∈R[¬f ] : s 6< r}.
2) If α∈{ϕ, pi′} or r = r then Foe(α, f, r) = {}.
3) Foe(ψ′, f, r) = {s∈R[¬f ] : s > r} = R[¬f ; r].
Finally, let us consider looping. To prove f we use α and a rule r. While proving f
we may have to prove other formulas. During a proof of one of these other formulas, if we
choose to use α and r again then we will be in a loop and so this choice should fail. To
prevent such a looping choice we need to record that α and r have been used previously. We
shall call such a record of used algorithms and rules a history. Its formal definition follows.
Definition 5.8. Suppose (R,>) is a plausible description and α∈Alg. Define
αR = {αr : r∈R}. Then H is an α-history iff H is a finite sequence of elements of
αR ∪ α′R that has no repeated elements.
Unfortunately using a history complicates Refinement 5.4 because we now no longer
have just an algorithm proving a formula, but an algorithm and a history proving a formula.
Therefore in (1), (2), and (3), α |−x becomes (α,H) |−x. In (3.1) α and r have now been
used so H must be updated to H+αr and hence α |−A(r) becomes (α,H+αr) |−A(r).
Also in (3.2.1) α and t have been used so H must be updated to H+αt and hence α |−A(t)
becomes (α,H+αt) |−A(t). Similarly in (3.2.2) α′ and s have been used and so H must be
updated to H+α′s and hence α′ 6|−A(s) becomes (α′,H+α′s) 6|−A(s). Finally to prevent
looping we must be sure that αr /∈H in (3.1), αt /∈H in (3.2.1), and α′s /∈H in (3.2.2).
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Incorporating these changes into Refinement 5.4 gives our formal definition of the proof
algorithms and proof relation |− . The letter I is attached to these final inference conditions.
Definition 5.9. Suppose P = (R,>) is a plausible description, Ax = Ax (R), α∈Alg , H
is an α-history, and f is a formula. The proof relation for P, |− , and the proof
algorithms are defined by I1 to I3.
I1) If F is a finite set of formulas then (α,H) |−F iff ∀f ∈F , (α,H) |− f .
I2) If Ax |= f then (α,H) |− f . Also (ϕ,H) |− f iff Ax |= f .
I3) If Ax 6|= f and α 6= ϕ then (α,H) |− f iff ∃r∈Rsd[f ] such that I3.1 and I3.2 hold.
I3.1) αr /∈H and (α,H+αr) |−A(r).
I3.2) ∀s∈Foe(α, f, r) either
I3.2.1) ∃t∈Rsd[f ; s] such that αt /∈H and (α,H+αt) |−A(t); or
I3.2.2) α′s /∈H and (α′,H+α′s) 6|−A(s).
The following notation is useful.
Definition 5.10. If P is a plausible description, α∈Alg, and x is either a formula or a
finite set of formulas then define
x is α-provable iff α |−x iff (α, ()) |−x, and
P(α) = {f ∈Fml : α |− f} to be the set of all α-provable formulas.
A semantic aside
Subsection 5.2, and its culmination in Definition 5.9, can be given a semantic interpretation.
By Theorem 7.3(3), the meaning of the strict rule A→f is that for any proof algorithm α,
if α |−A then α |− f . The meaning of the defeasible rule A⇒f is that for any non-factual
proof algorithm α, if α |−A and the evidence against f is defeated then α |− f . Exactly
what the evidence against f is and how it is defeated is given by I3.2. By I3.2 the warning
rule s = A❀¬f can only be used as evidence against f ; and exactly how s can be defeated
is also given by I3.2. Thus Definition 5.9 can be seen as giving a meaning to each of the
three kinds of rules.
Similarly Definition 5.9, and the explanations preceding it, can be seen as giving a
meaning to each of the proof algorithms. By I2, we see that ϕ |− f means Ax |= f . Each
of the non-factual proof algorithms, α, regards Rsd[f ] as the set of potential evidence for
f ; and how α establishes that there is actual evidence for f is given by I3.1. Given some
actual evidence r for f , the set that α regards as evidence against f is Foe(α, f, r). Exactly
how this evidence can be defeated is given by I3.2.
5.3 A Proof Theory
Definition 5.9 is recursive, however it can be iterated to yield a rooted tree — defined in
Definition 5.13 — that could be regarded as the structure of a proof in PPL. The nodes of
this tree will have special labels called tags which we now define.
Definition 5.11. Suppose (R,>) is a plausible description, α∈Alg , F is a finite set of
formulas, H is an α-history, f is a formula, r∈Rsd[f ], s∈R[¬f ], and p is a node of a tree.
The tag, t(p), of p is a triple t(p) = (Subj (p), op(p), pv (p)).
The subject of p, Subj (p), has one of the following forms: (α,H,F ), −(α′,H, F ),
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(α,H, f), (α,H, f, r), or (α,H, f, r, s).
The operation of p, op(p), is either min (for minimum), max (for maximum), or −. If
op(p) is min [resp. max, −] then p is referred to as a min [resp. max, minus] node.
The proof value of p, pv(p), is either +1 or −1.
The arithmetic properties of the proof values are defined below. These are as expected,
but note that max{} = −1 and min{} = +1.
Definition 5.12. Suppose S⊆{+1,−1}.
1) minS = −1 iff −1∈S. (3) maxS = +1 iff +1∈S. (5) −−1 = +1.
2) minS = +1 iff −1 /∈S. (4) maxS = −1 iff +1 /∈S. (6) −+1 = −1.
So min and max act like quantifiers when applied to a set of proof values. That is,
minS = −1 iff there exists v in S such that v = −1;
maxS = +1 iff there exists v in S such that v = +1;
minS = +1 iff for all v in S, v = +1; and
maxS = −1 iff for all v in S, v = −1.
Definition 5.13. Let P = (R,>) be a plausible description. Then T is an evaluation
tree of P iff T is a rooted tree constructed as follows. Each node, p, of T has exactly one
tag, t(p). For each node p of T there is exactly one number, #p, in [1..6] such that p
satisfies T#p and T7.
T1) Subj (p) = (α,H,F ), α∈Alg , H is an α-history, and F is a finite set of formulas.
Define S(p) = {(α,H, f) : f ∈F}. Then op(p) = min, p has |S(p)| children, and each
element of S(p) is the subject of exactly one child of p. If S(p) = {} then
pv(p) = +1.
T2) Subj (p) = (α,H, f), α∈Alg , H is an α-history, f is a formula, and Ax |= f .
Then p has no children and t(p) = ((α,H, f),min,+1).
T3) Subj (p) = (α,H, f), α ∈ Alg−{ϕ}, H is an α-history, f is a formula, and Ax 6|= f .
Define S(p) = {(α,H, f, r) : αr /∈H and r∈Rsd[f ]}. Then op(p) = max, p has |S(p)|
children, and each element of S(p) is the subject of exactly one child of p. If
S(p) = {} then pv(p) = −1.
T4) Subj (p) = (α,H, f, r), α ∈ Alg−{ϕ}, H is an α-history, f is a formula, Ax 6|= f ,
αr /∈H, and r∈Rsd[f ]. Define S(p) = {(α,H+αr,A(r))} ∪
{(α,H, f, r, s) : s∈Foe(α, f, r)}. Then op(p) = min, p has |S(p)| children, and each
element of S(p) is the subject of exactly one child of p.
T5) Subj (p) = (α,H, f, r, s), α ∈ Alg−{ϕ, pi′}, H is an α-history, f is a formula, Ax 6|= f ,
αr /∈H, r∈Rsd[f ], and s∈Foe(α, f, r). Define S(p) = {(α,H+αt,A(t)) : αt /∈H and
t∈Rsd[f ; s]} ∪ {−(α
′,H+α′s,A(s)) : α′s /∈H}. Then op(p) = max, p has |S(p)|
children, and each element of S(p) is the subject of exactly one child of p. If
S(p) = {} then pv(p) = −1.
T6) Subj (p) = −(α′,H, F ), α ∈ {pi, ψ, β, β′}∪{ψ′ : > is not empty}, H is an α-history,
and F is a finite set of formulas. Then op(p) = −; p has exactly one child, say p1;
and Subj (p1) = (α
′,H, F ).
T7) If op(p) = min then pv(p) = min{pv(c) : c is a child of p}.
If op(p) = max then pv(p) = max{pv (c) : c is a child of p}.
If op(p) = − and c is the child of p then pv(p) = −pv(c).
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It is possible for an evaluation tree to be infinite. Although this can be prevented by
insisting that the set of rules in a plausible description is finite, it is not necessary.
Definition 5.14. A plausible description P is a plausible theory iff every evaluation
tree of P is finite. A Propositional Plausible Logic consists of a plausible theory and
its proof relation.
Both the proof relation |− and evaluation trees are cumbersome to use for derivations by
hand. So we shall define a proof function P , which is easier to use and is a straightforward
translation of the proof relation |− of Definition 5.9 into the function P such that (α,H) |−x
iff P (α,H, x) = +1 and (α,H) 6|−x iff P (α,H, x) = −1. The auxiliary functions: For
(evidence for), and Dftd (defeated), are used in the definition of P .
Definition 5.15. Suppose P = (R,>) is a plausible theory, α∈Alg , H is an α-history,
and f is a formula. The proof function for P, P , and its auxiliary functions For and
Dftd are defined by P1 to P5.
P1) If F is a finite set of formulas, then P (α,H,F ) = min{P (α,H, f) : f ∈F}.
P2) If Ax |= f then P (α,H, f) = +1. Also P (ϕ,H, f) = +1 iff Ax |= f .
P3) If Ax 6|= f and α 6= ϕ then
P (α,H, f) = max{For (α,H, f, r) : αr /∈H and r∈Rsd[f ]}.
P4) If Ax 6|= f and α 6= ϕ and αr /∈H and r∈Rsd[f ] then
For (α,H, f, r) = min[{P (α,H+αr,A(r))} ∪ {Dftd(α,H, f, r, s) : s∈Foe(α, f, r)}].
P5) If Ax 6|= f and α ∈ Alg−{ϕ, pi′} and αr /∈H and r∈Rsd[f ] and s∈Foe(α, f, r) then
Dftd(α,H, f, r, s) = max[{P (α,H+αt,A(t)) : αt /∈H and t∈Rsd[f ; s]} ∪
{−P (α′,H+α′s,A(s)) : α′s /∈H}].
We end this subsection by stating the relationship between proof relations (Definition
5.9), evaluation trees (Definition 5.13), and proof functions (Definition 5.15). But before
we can do this we need the following notation.
Definition 5.16. Suppose P = (R,>) is a plausible theory, α∈Alg , H is an α-history,
and x is either a formula or finite set of formulas. Let T [α,H, x] denote the evaluation
tree of P whose root node has the subject (α,H, x). Let T (α,H, x) denote the proof value
of the root node of T [α,H, x].
Theorem 5.17 (Notational Equivalence). Suppose P is a plausible theory, α∈Alg , H is
an α-history, and x is either a formula or a finite set of formulas.
Then P (α,H, x) = +1 iff (α,H) |−x iff T (α,H, x) = +1.
The idea of ‘logical consequence’ in PPL is defined and most easily understood by
considering the proof relation |− of Definition 5.9. The evaluation trees of Definition 5.13
are mainly used to prove results about PPL. Proof functions (Definition 5.15) make hand
evaluations easier. So the equivalences expressed in Theorem 5.17 are essential.
5.4 A Truth Theory
Logics often have a function from the set of all formulas to a set of truth values such that
(a) the truth value of a formula is related to its proof value, and
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(b) the truth value of a formula is related to the truth values of its parts.
Subsection 3.10 deals with (b), while this subsection is concerned with (a).
Consider the possibilities that could occur when the proof algorithm α evaluates the
evidence for and against the formula f . If there is sufficient evidence for both f and ¬f
then, as far as α is concerned, f and ¬f are ambiguous, and so both should be assigned the
ambiguous truth value a. If there is sufficient evidence for f but insufficient evidence for
¬f then, as far as α is concerned, f is usually true and ¬f is usually false, so f should be
assigned the usually true truth value t and ¬f should be assigned the usually false truth
value f. If there is insufficient evidence for both f and ¬f then α does not know enough
about f or about ¬f , and so both should be assigned the undetermined truth value u.
Since the truth value of a formula, f , depends on the proof algorithm, α, evaluating
its evidence, we need a veracity (or truth) function V such that V (α, f) is in the set of
plausible truth values {a, t, f,u}.
Definition 5.18. Suppose P = (R,>) is a plausible theory, α∈Alg , and f is any
formula. The truth function for P, V , from Alg×Fml to the set of plausible truth
values {a, t, f,u} is defined by V1 to V4.
V1) V (α, f) = a iff α |− f and α |−¬f .
V2) V (α, f) = t iff α |− f and α 6|− ¬f .
V3) V (α, f) = f iff α 6|− f and α |−¬f .
V4) V (α, f) = u iff α 6|− f and α 6|− ¬f .
Now that PPL is defined we need to show that it is well-behaved and satisfies all the
principles in Section 3. But before we do that it is worthwhile to get a better understanding
of the logic by applying it to some examples.
6. Examples
We shall show how PPL represents and reasons with the first three signpost examples in
Section 3. To save space and effort we shall use some of the theorems in Section 7; this will
also illustrate some of the utility of these theorems. In some of the following examples we
shall use the following equations denoted by † and ✷.
†) P (α,H, {f}) = P (α,H, f), by P1.
✷) P (α,H, {}) = min{} = +1, by P1.
6.1 The Non-Monotonicity Example
Recall the following from Example 3.2.
1) a is probably true.
2) ¬a is (definitely) true.
We show that from (1) the conclusion is ‘a is plausible’; and from (1) and (2), that ‘a is
plausible’ cannot be deduced, but ‘¬a is true’ can be.
The plausible theory (R,>) which models (1) is defined as follows. The priority relation
> is empty, and R = {ra}, where ra is {}⇒a. So Rs = {} = Ax (R) = Ax , R[a] = {ra},
R[¬a] = {}. Also if l∈{a,¬a} and s∈R then R[l; s] = {}.
Evaluation 6.1.1. α∈{pi, ψ, β} and α |− a
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1α) P (α, (), a) = For (α, (), a, ra), by P3
2α) = P (α, (αra), {}), by P4, and Foe(α, a, ra) = {}
3α) = +1, by ✷
Some evaluations can be parameterised by the proof algorithm. The range of such a
parameter is given after the number of the evaluation. If an evaluation proves or disproves
something then this is given after the number of the evaluation.
Evaluation 6.1.1 and Theorem 5.17(Notational Equivalence), shows that pi, ψ, and β
can prove a using only (1).
The plausible theory (R,>) which models (1) and (2) is defined as follows. The priority
relation > is empty, and R = {ra, r
s
na}, where ra is {}⇒ a, and r
s
na is {}→¬a. Since
Rs = {r
s
na}, Ax (R) = Ax = {¬a}. So by P2, if α∈{ϕ, pi, ψ, β} then P (α, (),¬a) = +1.
Hence using only (1) and (2), ¬a is certain, and by Theorem 7.4(1)(Consistency), pi, ψ,
and β cannot prove a.
6.2 The Ambiguity Puzzle
We show that the pi and ψ proof algorithms are ambiguity propagating and that the β proof
algorithm is ambiguity blocking.
The plausible theory (R,>) which models the Ambiguity Puzzle (Example 3.3) is defined
as follows. The priority relation > is empty, and R = {ra, rna, rb, ranb}, where ra is {}⇒a,
rna is {}⇒¬a, rb is {}⇒b, and ranb is {a}⇒¬b.
Since Rs = {}, Ax (R) = Ax = {}. So R[a] = {ra}, R[b] = {rb}, R[¬a] = {rna}, and
R[¬b] = {ranb}. If l∈{a,¬a, b,¬b} and s∈R then R[l; s] = {}.
Evaluation 6.2.1. α∈{pi, ψ, β}
1α) P (α, (), b) = For (α, (), b, rb), by P3
2α) = min{P (α, (αrb), {}), Dftd(α, (), b, rb, ranb)}, by P4
3α) = Dftd(α, (), b, rb, ranb), by ✷
4α) = −P (α′, (α′ranb), a), by P5, †
5α) = −For(α′, (α′ranb), a, ra), by P3
Evaluation 6.2.2. α∈{pi, ψ} and α 6|− b
5α) P (α, (), b) = −For(α′, (α′ranb), a, ra), by Evaluation 6.2.1
6α) = −P (α′, (α′ranb, α
′ra), {}), by P4
7α) = −1, by ✷.
Evaluation 6.2.3. β |− b
5β) P (β, (), b) = −For (β′, (β′ranb), a, ra), by Evaluation 6.2.1
6β) = −min{P (β′, (β′ranb, β
′ra), {}), Dftd(β
′, (β′ranb), a, ra, rna)}, by P4
7β) = −Dftd(β′, (β′ranb), a, ra, rna), by ✷
8β) = −− P (β, (β′ranb, βrna), {}), by P5
9β) = +1, by ✷.
By Evaluation 6.2.2 and Theorems 5.17(Notational Equivalence) and 7.1(Decisiveness),
pi and ψ cannot prove b and so they are ambiguity propagating. By Evaluation 6.2.3 and
Theorem 5.17(Notational Equivalence), β proves b and so is ambiguity blocking.
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6.3 The 3-lottery Example
Recall the following from Example 3.1.
1) Exactly one element of {s1, s2, s3} is true.
2) Each element of {¬s1,¬s2,¬s3} is usually true.
3) The disjunction of any pair of elements of {s1, s2, s3} is usually true.
From (2) we get r11 to r13 below. From (3) we get r14 to r16 below. From (1) we have∨
{s1, s2, s3}, ¬
∧
{s1, s2}, ¬
∧
{s1, s3}, and ¬
∧
{s2, s3}. Converting these facts to clauses
gives: Ax = {
∨
{s1, s2, s3},
∨
{¬s1,¬s2},
∨
{¬s1,¬s3},
∨
{¬s2,¬s3}}.
The plausible theory (R,>) which models this situation is defined as follows. The
priority relation > is empty, and R = {r1, r2, ..., r16}, where r1: {} →
∧
Ax ,
r2: {¬s1} →
∨
{s2, s3}, r5: {
∧
{¬s2,¬s3}} → s1, r8: {s1} →
∧
{¬s2,¬s3},
r3: {¬s2} →
∨
{s1, s3}, r6: {
∧
{¬s1,¬s3}} → s2, r9: {s2} →
∧
{¬s1,¬s3},
r4: {¬s3} →
∨
{s1, s2}, r7: {
∧
{¬s1,¬s2}} → s3, r10: {s3} →
∧
{¬s1,¬s2},
r11: {} ⇒ ¬s1, r14: {} ⇒
∨
{s1, s2},
r12: {} ⇒ ¬s2, r15: {} ⇒
∨
{s1, s3},
r13: {} ⇒ ¬s3, r16: {} ⇒
∨
{s2, s3}.
Let U = {¬s1,¬s2,
∨
{s1, s2}}. If α∈{pi, ψ, β} then we show α proves each element of
U , α cannot prove the negation of each element of U , and α cannot prove
∧
{¬s1,¬s2}.
Note Rsd[¬s1] = {r2, r6, r7, r9, r10, r11, r16}, and R
s
d[s1] = {r5, r8} = R
s
d[
∧
{¬s2,¬s3}].
Evaluation 6.3.1. pi |−¬s1
1) P (pi, (),¬s1) = max{For (pi, (),¬s1, ri) : i∈{2, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 16}}, by P3
2) For (pi, (),¬s1, r11) = min{P (pi, (pir11), {}), Dftd(pi, (),¬s1, r11, r5),
Dftd(pi, (),¬s1, r11, r8)}, by P4
3) = min{−P (pi′, (pi′r5),
∧
{¬s2,¬s3}), −P (pi
′, (pi′r8), s1)}, by ✷, P5, †
4) P (pi′, (pi′r5),
∧
{¬s2,¬s3}) = For (pi
′, (pi′r5),
∧
{¬s2,¬s3}, r8), by P3
5) = P (pi′, (pi′r5, pi
′r8), s1), by P4, †
6) = max{}, by P3
7) = −1.
8) ∴ For (pi, (),¬s1, r11) = −P (pi
′, (pi′r8), s1), by (7) to (2)
9) = −For(pi′, (pi′r8), s1, r5), by P3
10) = −P (pi′, (pi′r8, pi
′r5),
∧
{¬s2,¬s3}), by P4, †
11) = −max{}, by P3
12) = +1.
13) ∴ P (pi, (),¬s1) = +1, by (12) to (8), and (1).
Because the 3-lottery example is symmetric in s1, s2, and s3, a very similar evaluation
gives P (pi, (),¬s2) = +1 and P (pi, (),¬s3) = +1. Hence by †, P (pi, (), {¬s3}) = +1.
By Theorem 5.17(Notational Equivalence), pi |−¬s1, pi |−¬s2, and pi |− {¬s3}.
By Theorem 7.3(3)(Modus Ponens for strict rules), using r4, we get pi |−
∨
{s1, s2}.
Thus pi proves each element in U = {¬s1,¬s2,
∨
{s1, s2}}.
Suppose α∈{pi, ψ, β}. Then by Theorem 7.6(The proof algorithm hierarchy), α proves
each element of U . By Theorem 7.4(1)(Consistency), the negation of each element of U
cannot be proved by α. Hence by Theorem 7.3(2)(Right Weakening), α cannot prove
∧
{¬s1,¬s2}.
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7. Properties of Propositional Plausible Logic (PPL)
We shall show that PPL is well-behaved and satisfies all the principles in Section 3.
Theorem 7.1 (Decisiveness). Suppose P is a plausible theory, α∈Alg, H is an α-history,
and x is either a formula or a finite set of formulas.
Then either T (α,H, x) = +1 or T (α,H, x) = −1, but not both.
Knowing that every evaluation will terminate is very comforting. So at the end of each
evaluation either we will have a proof or we will not. If we do not have a proof then maybe
there is a proof but we missed it. Fortunately decisiveness assures us that an evaluation
will always terminate, and when it does we will have either a proof or a disproof — that is
a demonstration that there is no proof.
Theorem 7.2 (Plausible Conjunction). Suppose (R,>) is a plausible description,
Ax = Ax (R), α∈Alg, H is an α-history, and f and g are both formulas.
If Ax |= f and (α,H) |− g then (α,H) |−
∧
{f, g}.
The Plausible Conjunction theorem shows that each α satisfies the Plausible Conjunction
Principle (Principle 3.3.2).
Theorem 7.3 (Right Weakening). Suppose (R,>) is a plausible description, Ax = Ax(R),
α∈Alg , H is an α-history, and f and g are both formulas.
1) If (α,H) |− f and Ax∪{f} |= g then (α,H) |− g. [Strong Right Weakening]
2) If (α,H) |− f and f |= g then (α,H) |− g. [Right Weakening]
3) If A→g ∈ Rs and (α,H) |−A then (α,H) |− g. [Modus Ponens for strict rules]
Theorem 7.3(1) shows that α has the strong right weakening property, and hence has
all the right weakening properties mentioned in Subsection 3.6.
Theorem 7.4 (Consistency). Suppose (R,>) is a plausible theory, Ax = Ax (R),
α ∈ {ϕ, pi, ψ, β, β′}, and both f and g are any formulas.
1) If α |− f and α |− g then Ax∪{f, g} is satisfiable.
2) If (ψ,H) |− f then (ψ′,H) 6|− ¬f .
3) Suppose that whenever s∈Rsd[¬f ] and (pi
′,H+pi′s) |−A(s) then Rsd[f ; s] = {}.
If (pi,H) |− f then (pi′,H) 6|− ¬f .
Part 1 of Theorem 7.4 says that PPL is strongly 2-consistent. Theorem 7.4(2) says that
if there is sufficient evidence for ψ to prove f then the evidence for ¬f is too weak for ψ′
to register. Theorem 7.4(3) gives conditions under which a similar statement can be said
about pi and pi′. In particular when either Rsd[¬f ] or > is empty.
Theorem 7.5 (Truth Values). Suppose (R,>) is a plausible theory, α∈Alg , F is a finite
set of formulas, and f is a formula.
1) V (α,¬¬f) = V (α, f).
2) V (α, f) = t iff V (α,¬f) = f.
3) V (α, f) = f iff V (α,¬f) = t.
4) V (α, f) = a iff V (α,¬f) = a.
5) V (α, f) = u iff V (α,¬f) = u.
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6) If V (α,
∧
F ) = t then for each f in F , V (α, f) = t.
7) If f ∈F and V (α, f) = t then V (α,
∨
F ) = t.
8) If α∈{ϕ, pi, ψ, β, β′} then V (α, f)∈{t, f,u}.
9) If V (α, f) = a then α∈{ψ′, pi′}.
10) If V (α, f) = t then α |− f . (completeness)
11) If α∈{ϕ, pi, ψ, β, β′} and α |− f then V (α, f) = t. (soundness)
Parts 1 to 5 of Theorem 7.5 show that negation is truth-functional with desirable prop-
erties. In Subsection 3.10 the desired relation between the truth values of a conjunction and
its conjuncts is given by statement (4), and the desired relation between the truth values
of a disjunction and its disjuncts is given by statement (5). Parts 6 and 7 of Theorem 7.5
show that PPL satisfies these relationships.
The primed algorithms β′, ψ′, and pi′, assess the significance of evidence against a
formula. Theorem 7.5(9) shows that the threshold of significance for ψ′ and pi′ is so low that
they can assess the evidence against both f and ¬f as significant. However Theorem 7.5(8)
shows that the other algorithms have a 3-valued truth system. The expected completeness
and soundness results are given by parts 10 and 11 of Theorem 7.5.
The final result shows the relationships between the various proof algorithms. Recall
Definition 5.10 defines P(α) to be the set of all formulas provable from P using the proof
algorithm α.
Theorem 7.6 (The proof algorithm hierarchy). Suppose P = (R,>) is a plausible theory.
1) P(ϕ) ⊆ P(pi) ⊆ P(ψ) ⊆ P(β) = P(β′) ⊆ P(ψ′) ⊆ P(pi′).
2) If > is empty then P(ϕ) ⊆ P(pi) = P(ψ) ⊆ P(β) = P(β′) ⊆ P(ψ′) = P(pi′).
So β′ proves exactly the same formulas as β. Also if > is empty then pi and ψ prove
exactly the same formulas, as do pi′ and ψ′. The set of formulas proved by pi′ is very similar
to the union of all extensions of an extension based logic, like Default Logic.
The hierarchy shown in Theorem 7.6 is consistent with the intuition that ambiguity
propagating proof algorithms are more cautious than ambiguity blocking algorithms. A
similar hierarchy for a Defeasible Logic, also consistent with this intuition, is given in
Section 5 of (Billington, Antoniou, Governatori, & Maher, 2010).
When a logic has several proof algorithms it is important to determine how they relate,
because this gives a greater theoretical understanding of the logic. Theorem 7.6 shows
that the proof algorithms of PPL are totally ordered according to reliability or level of
confidence. Suppose that the plausible-reasoning situation gives no information concerning
whether ambiguity should be blocked or propagated. If the proof algorithm hierarchy is not
totally ordered then we could have two incomparable algorithms only one of which proved
the formula of interest. In such circumstances it is not clear what should be concluded. By
Theorem 7.6 no such dilemma can occur in PPL.
We shall now check that PPL satisfies all the principles in Section 3.
PPL has strict and defeasible rules, and so can distinguish between factual and plau-
sible statements. Moreover PPL does not use numbers, like probabilities, that could lead
to a proved formula being more precise than the information used to derive it. So the
Representation Principle (Principle 3.1) is satisfied.
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The correspondence between the general ‘plausible-structure’ notation of Sections 1 and
3 and the particular notation of PPL is as follows. The plausible-structure S corresponds to
the plausible description P = (R,>). If we let Ax = Ax(R), then Fact(S) corresponds to
Ax , Thm(Fact(S)) corresponds to {f : Ax |= f}, and Thm(L, α,S) corresponds to P(α).
For the rest of this section suppose α is in {pi, ψ, β}.
As explained in the paragraph above Refinement 5.1, the Evidence Principle (Principle
3.2.1) is satisfied. In Subsection 6.1 we showed that α satisfies the Non-Monotonicity
Principle (Principle 3.2.2). Hence α satisfies Principle 3.2.
In Subsection 6.3 we showed that all three elements of U = {¬s1,¬s2,
∨
{s1, s2}} were
α-provable; but that the conjunction
∧
{¬s1,¬s2} was not α-provable. Thus α satisfies
the Non-Conjunction Principle (Principle 3.3.1). Theorem 7.2 shows that α satisfies the
Plausible Conjunction Principle (Principle 3.3.2). By Theorem 7.4(1), both s1 and s2 are
not α-provable. Thus α satisfies the Non-Disjunction Principle (Principle 3.4). Because
U is not satisfiable α satisfies the Non-3-Consistency Principle (Principle 3.7.3). Theorem
7.4(1) shows that α satisfies the Strong 2-Consistency Principle (Principle 3.7.2) and so
satisfies the 1-Consistency Principle (Principle 3.7.1).
By I2 of Definition 5.9, ϕ and α are supraclassical. So by the remark after Principle 3.5,
they satisfy the Plausible Supraclassicality Principle (Principle 3.5). Theorem 7.3(1) shows
that α has the Strong Right Weakening property. So by the remark after Principle 3.6, α
satisfies the Plausible Right Weakening Principle (Principle 3.6).
By I2 of Definition 5.9, ϕ is a factual proof algorithm. Subsection 6.2 shows that pi and ψ
are ambiguity propagating proof algorithms, and β is an ambiguity blocking proof algorithm.
Also PPL makes the proof algorithm used explicit. Hence PPL satisfies the Many Proof
Algorithms Principle (Principle 3.8). Theorems 7.1 and 5.17 show that ϕ and α satisfy the
Decisiveness Principle (Principle 3.9). The truth-value system given in Subsection 5.4 and
Theorem 7.5 shows that α satisfies the Included Middle Principle (Principle 3.10).
Thus PPL satisfies all the principles in Section 3.
8. Conclusion
We have tried to characterise those propositional logics that do plausible reasoning by
suggesting some principles that such logics should satisfy. Four important examples of
plausible reasoning are presented, and several principles are derived from these examples.
Propositional Plausible Logic (PPL) has been defined. It satisfies all the principles,
and deals with negation, conjunction, and disjunction. PPL has been applied to the first
three examples, and several theorems about PPL are proved in the appendices. PPL has
been implemented by George Wilson under the direction of Dr. Andrew Rock, who has
implemented other Defeasible Logics. As far as we know, PPL is the only non-numeric
non-monotonic logic that satisfies all the principles in Section 3 and also correctly reasons
with all the examples in Section 3.
Future research could make PPL significantly more useful and powerful by incorporating
variables in a similar way to the programming language Prolog.
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The Appendices
Appendix A. Proof of Theorems 7.1 and 5.17
Lemma A.1. Let L and M be any two sets of literals.
1)
∨
L |=
∨
M iff either L⊆M or
∨
M is a tautology.
2)
∧
M |=
∧
L iff either L⊆M or
∧
M is a contradiction.
Proof
Let L and M be any two sets of literals.
(1) If L⊆M or
∨
M is a tautology then
∨
L |=
∨
M .
Conversely suppose
∨
L |=
∨
M . If L−M = {} then L ⊆M . So suppose there is a
literal l such that l ∈ L−M . If
∨
M is not a tautology then there is a valuation v such that
v(
∨
M) = F and v(l) = T. But that contradicts
∨
L |=
∨
M , so
∨
M is must be a tautology.
(2) If L⊆M or
∧
M is a contradiction then
∧
M |=
∧
L.
Conversely suppose
∧
M |=
∧
L. If L−M = {} then L ⊆M . So suppose there is a
literal l such that l ∈ L−M . If
∧
M is not a contradiction then there is a valuation v such
that v(
∧
M) = T and v(l) = F. But that contradicts
∧
M |=
∧
L, so
∧
M is must be a
contradiction.
EndProofLemA.1
Lemma A.2. Let C be a set of clauses.
1) l∈Err(C) iff ∼l∈Err(C).
2) Sat(C) ⊆ C.
3)
∨
{} /∈ Sat(C).
4)
∨
{} /∈ Res(Sat(C)).
5) C is satisfiable iff
∨
{} /∈Res(C).
6) Sat(C) is satisfiable, Res(Sat(C)) is satisfiable, and CorRes(Sat(C)) is satisfiable.
Proof
Let C be a set of clauses.
(1, 2, 3) These parts follow immediately from Definition 2.8.
(4) Assume
∨
{} ∈ Res(Sat(C)). Since
∨
{} /∈ Sat(C), there is a literal l such that
∨
{l}∈Res(Sat(C)) and
∨
{∼l}∈Res(Sat(C)). Since Sat(C) ⊆ C, Res(Sat(C)) ⊆ Res(C).
So
∨
{l} ∈ Res(C) and
∨
{∼l} ∈ Res(C). Hence l ∈ Err(C) and ∼l ∈ Err(C). So by
Definition 2.8, for all c in Sat(C), l /∈Lit(c). But
∨
{l}∈Res(Sat(C)), so there exists c in
Sat(C) such that l∈Lit(c). This contradiction shows that
∨
{} /∈ Res(Sat(C)).
(5) This is well known from classical propositional logic.
(6) By parts (4) and (5) of this lemma, Sat(C) is satisfiable. Hence Res(Sat(C)) is
satisfiable and so CorRes(Sat(C)) is satisfiable.
EndProofLemA.2
We say that a set L of literals is contingent iff L is not empty and if a is any atom
then {a,¬a} 6⊆L.
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Lemma A.3. Suppose (R,>) is a plausible description, Ax = Ax (R), α ∈Alg , H is an
α-history, and f is a formula.
1) Ax is satisfiable.
2) Each axiom in Ax is contingent.
3) Each axiom in Ax is either a literal
or
∨
L where L is a finite set of literals such that |L|≥2.
4) If R[f ] 6= {} then Ax∪{f} is satisfiable and Ax 6|= ¬f .
5) If (α,H) |− f then Ax∪{f} is satisfiable and Ax 6|= ¬f .
Proof
Suppose (R,>) is a plausible description, Ax = Ax(R), α∈Alg, H is an α-history, and
f is a formula.
(1) By Definition 5.4(PD1), Ax = CorRes(Sat(Ax )). By Lemma A.2(6),
CorRes(Sat(Ax )) is satisfiable. Hence Ax is satisfiable.
(2) By the definitions, Ax = CorRes(Sat(Ax )) = SmpMinCtge(Res(Sat(Ax ))); so each
axiom is either contingent or empty. But Ax is satisfiable, so each axiom is contingent.
(3) This follows from part (2) and Ax = Smp(C) where C is a set of clauses.
(4) Suppose R[f ] 6= {}. By Definition 5.5(2), there exists r in R such that Ax∪{c(r)}
is satisfiable and Ax∪{c(r)} |= f . Hence Ax∪{f} is satisfiable, and so Ax 6|= ¬f .
(5) Suppose (α,H) |− f . By Definition 5.9(I2,I3), either Ax |= f or Rsd[f ] 6= {}. If
Ax |= f then by part (1), Ax∪{f} is satisfiable. If Rsd[f ] 6= {} then by part (4), Ax∪{f}
is satisfiable. But Ax∪{f} is satisfiable implies Ax 6|= ¬f .
EndProofLemA.3
Lemma A.4. Suppose (R,>) is a plausible description, and Ax = Ax (R).
1) If r∈Rs then either A(r) = {}; or A(r) = {l}, where l is a literal;
or A(r) = {
∧
L}, where |L|≥2 and L is contingent.
2) If r∈Rs then Ax∪A(r) |= c(r).
Proof
Suppose (R,>) is a plausible description, and Ax = Ax(R).
(1) By Lemma A.3(2), if
∨
L∈Ax then
∨
L is contingent and so L is contingent. Hence,
if {}⊂K⊂L then L−K is contingent. So ∼(L−K) is contingent. Therefore the result
holds for all r in Rul(Ax ). So by Definition 5.4(PD2), the result holds for all r in Rs.
(2) Take any r in Rul(Ax ), and suppose v is a valuation such that v(Ax∪A(r)) is the
true truth value; that is, v |= Ax ∪A(r). Then either r is {} → c where c ∈Ax , or r is
{smp(
∧
∼(L−K))}→smp(
∨
K), where {}⊂K⊂L and
∨
L∈Ax . Now v |= c, so in the first
case v |= c(r). In the second case v |=
∨
L, and v |=
∧
∼(L−K). Then for all l ∈ L−K,
v |= ∼l and so v 6|= l. But L = K ∪ (L−K). So v |=
∨
(K ∪ (L−K)) and hence v |=
∨
K.
Thus v |= c(r) in the second case too. So the lemma holds for all r in Rul(Ax ).
Take any r0 in Rs−Rul(Ax ), and suppose v |= Ax ∪A(r0). Then r0 is A(r0) →
∧
c(Rul(Ax , A(r0))). For each r in Rul(Ax , A(r0)), r is A(r0) → c(r). By the previ-
ous paragraph, v |= c(r). But this is true for every r in Rul(Ax , A(r0)) and so v |=∧
c(Rul(Ax , A(r0))).
EndProofLemA.4
Lemma A.5. Suppose (R0, >) is a plausible description, Ax is its set of axioms, R⊆R0,
f and g are formulas, α∈Alg , and {r, s}⊆R0.
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1) R[f ]⊆R.
2) If R′⊆R then R′[f ]⊆R[f ].
3) If f ≡ g then R[f ] = R[g].
4) If Ax |= f then R[
∧
{f, g}] = R[g] and Foe(α,
∧
{f, g}, r) ⊆ Foe(α, g, r).
5) If Ax ∪{f} |= g then (a) Ax ∪{¬g} |= ¬f , (b) R[f ] ⊆ R[g], (c) R[f ; s] ⊆ R[g; s],
(d) R[¬g] ⊆ R[¬f ], (e) Foe(α, g, r) ⊆ Foe(α, f, r).
6) If Ax∪{f, g} is unsatisfiable then R[f ] ⊆ R[¬g] and R[g] ⊆ R[¬f ].
Proof
(1) By Definition 5.5(2), R[f ]⊆R.
(2) Suppose R′⊆R. Then R′[f ] = {r∈R′ : Ax∪{c(r)} is satisfiable and Ax∪{c(r)} |= f}
⊆ {r∈R : Ax∪{c(r)} is satisfiable and Ax∪{c(r)} |= f} = R[f ].
(3) Suppose f ≡ g. By Definition 5.5(2), R[f ] = {r∈R : Ax∪{c(r)} is satisfiable and
Ax∪{c(r)} |= f} = {r∈R : Ax∪{c(r)} is satisfiable and Ax∪{c(r)} |= g} = R[g].
(4) Suppose Ax |= f . By Definition 5.5(2), R[g]
= {r∈R : Ax∪{c(r)} is satisfiable and Ax∪{c(r)} |= g}
= {r∈R : Ax∪{c(r)} is satisfiable and Ax∪{c(r)} |= f and Ax∪{c(r)} |= g}
= {r∈R : Ax∪{c(r)} is satisfiable and Ax∪{c(r)} |=
∧
{f, g}}
= R[
∧
{f, g}].
Let Claim 1 be: Foe(α,
∧
{f, g}, r) ⊆ Foe(α, g, r).
If α∈{ϕ, pi′} or r = r then Foe(α,
∧
{f, g}, r) = {}. Hence Claim 1 holds.
Suppose α = ψ′. Then Foe(ψ′,
∧
{f, g}, r) = {s∈R[¬
∧
{f, g}] : s > r} and Foe(ψ′, g, r) =
{s∈R[¬g] : s > r}. Take any s in Foe(ψ′,
∧
{f, g}, r). Then s∈R, Ax∪{c(s)} is satisfiable,
Ax ∪{c(s)} |= ¬
∧
{f, g}, and s > r. But Ax |= f , so Ax ∪{c(s)} |= ¬g and therefore
s∈Foe(ψ′, g, r). Hence Claim 1 holds.
So suppose α ∈ {pi, ψ, β, β′} and r 6= r. Then Foe(α,
∧
{f, g}, r) = {s ∈R[¬
∧
{f, g}] :
s 6< r} and Foe(α, g, r) = {s ∈ R[¬g] : s 6< r}. Take any s in Foe(α,
∧
{f, g}, r). Then
s ∈ R, Ax ∪{c(s)} is satisfiable, Ax ∪{c(s)} |= ¬
∧
{f, g}, and s 6< r. But Ax |= f , so
Ax∪{c(s)} |= ¬g and therefore s∈Foe(α, g, r). Hence Claim 1 holds.
Thus Claim 1 is proved.
(5) Suppose Ax ∪{f} |= g. By Definition 5.5(2,3), R[f ] = {r ∈ R : Ax ∪{c(r)} is
satisfiable and Ax∪{c(r)} |= f} and R[f ; s] = {t∈R[f ] : t > s}.
(a) Every valuation satisfies exactly one of f or ¬f . Hence Ax∪{¬g} |= ¬f .
(b) Take any r in R[f ]. Then Ax ∪{c(r)} is satisfiable and Ax ∪{c(r)} |= f . Hence
Ax∪{c(r)} |= g and so r∈R[g]. Thus R[f ] ⊆ R[g].
(c) Take any t in R[f ; s]. Then t∈R[f ] and t > s. By part (b), t∈R[g] and so t∈R[g; s].
Thus R[f ; s] ⊆ R[g; s].
(d) This follows from parts (a) and (b).
(e) This follows from parts (a) and (c).
(6) Suppose Ax ∪{f, g} is unsatisfiable. Take any r in R[f ]. Then Ax ∪{c(r)} is
satisfiable and Ax ∪{c(r)} |= f . Hence Ax ∪{c(r)} |= ¬g. Therefore r ∈ R[¬g] and so
R[f ] ⊆ R[¬g]. By swapping f and g we get R[g] ⊆ R[¬f ].
EndProofLemA.5
We need to extend the notation introduced in Definition 5.16.
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Definition A.6. Suppose P = (R,>) is a plausible theory, α∈Alg, H is an α-history, F
is a finite set of formulas, f is a formula, r∈Rsd[f ], and s∈R[¬f ].
1) Let T [α,H,F ] be the evaluation tree of P whose root has the subject (α,H,F ); and
let T (α,H,F ) be the proof value of the root of T [α,H,F ].
2) Let T [α,H, f ] be the evaluation tree of P whose root has the subject (α,H, f); and
let T (α,H, f) be the proof value of the root of T [α,H, f ].
3) Let T [α,H, f, r] be the evaluation tree of P whose root has the subject (α,H, f, r); and
let T (α,H, f, r) be the proof value of the root of T [α,H, f, r].
4) Let T [α,H, f, r, s] be the evaluation tree of P whose root has the subject (α,H, f, r, s);
and let T (α,H, f, r, s) be the proof value of the root of T [α,H, f, r, s].
5) Let T [−(α,H,F )] be the evaluation tree of P whose root has the subject −(α,H,F );
and let T (−(α,H,F )) be the proof value of the root of T [−(α,H,F )].
Theorem A.7 (Theorem 7.1 Decisiveness). Suppose P is a plausible theory, α∈Alg , H is
an α-history, and x is either a formula or a finite set of formulas.
1) T [α,H, x] has finitely many nodes.
2) Either T (α,H, x) = +1 or T (α,H, x) = −1 but not both.
Proof
(1) follows from Definition 5.14.
(2) follows from part (1) of this lemma and Definition 5.13.
EndProofThmA.7
Theorem A.8 (Theorem 5.17 Notational Equivalence). Suppose (R,>) is a plausible the-
ory, α∈Alg , H is an α-history, F is a finite set of formulas, and f is a formula.
1) P (α,H,F ) = +1 iff (α,H) |−F iff T (α,H,F ) = +1.
2) P (α,H, f) = +1 iff (α,H) |− f iff T (α,H, f) = +1.
3) Suppose Ax 6|= f and α 6= ϕ and αr /∈H and r∈Rsd[f ] and f is satisfiable.
Then For (α,H, f, r) = +1
iff T (α,H, f, r) = +1
iff (α,H+αr) |−A(r) and ∀s∈Foe(α, f, r), Dftd(α,H, f, r, s) = +1.
4) Suppose Ax 6|= f and α ∈ Alg−{ϕ, pi′} and αr /∈H and r∈Rsd[f ] and f is satisfiable
and s∈Foe(α, f, r). Then Dftd(α,H, f, r, s) = +1
iff T (α,H, f, r, s) = +1
iff either ∃t∈Rsd[f ; s] such that αt /∈H and (α,H+αt) |−A(t);
or α′s /∈H and (α′,H+α′s) 6|−A(s).
Proof
Let P = (R,>) be a plausible theory. The proof is by induction on the number of
nodes in an evaluation tree of P. Let p be the only node of an evaluation tree of P.
If p satisfies T1 then the subject of p is (α,H, {}) and the proof value of p is +1. So
T (α,H, {}) = +1. By P1, P (α,H, {}) = min{} = +1. By I1, (α,H) |− {}.
If p satisfies T2 then the subject of p is (α,H, f) and the proof value of p is +1. So
T (α,H, f) = +1. By P2, P (α,H, f) = +1. By I2, (α,H) |− f .
If p satisfies T3 then the subject of p is (α,H, f) and the proof value of p is −1. So
T (α,H, f) = −1. Let S(p) = {(α,H, f, r) : αr /∈H and r∈Rsd[f ]}. By T3, S(p) is empty.
By P3, P (α,H, f) = max{For (α,H, f, r) : (α,H, f, r)∈S(p)} = max{} = −1. Since S(p)
is empty, for all r in Rsd[f ], αr∈H. Hence I3.1 fails and so (α,H) 6|− f .
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Since p has no children, p does not satisfy T4 or T6.
If p satisfies T5 then the subject of p is (α,H, f, r, s) and the proof value of p is −1.
So T (α,H, f, r, s) = −1. Let S(p) = {(α,H+αt,A(t)) : αt /∈ H and t ∈ Rsd[f ; s]} ∪
{−(α′,H+α′s,A(s)) : α′s /∈H}. Also let S′ = {P (α,H+αt,A(t)) : αt /∈H and t∈Rsd[f ; s]}
∪ {−P (α′,H+α′s,A(s)) : α′s /∈H}.
By T5, S(p) is empty, and so S′ is also empty. By P5, Dftd(α,H, f, r, s) = maxS′ = max{}
= −1. Since S(p) = {}, we have for each t in Rsd[f ; s], αt∈H; and α
′s∈H. Hence the last
characterisation of Dftd(α,H, f, r, s) = +1 in part (4) is false.
Thus the result holds for all evaluation trees of P that have only the root node.
Take any positive integer n. We shall denote the following inductive hypothesis by
IndHyp. Suppose the result holds for all evaluation trees of P that have less than n+1
nodes. Let T be an evaluation tree of P that has n+1 nodes and let p be the root of T .
Then p has at least one child.
If p satisfies T1 then the subject of p is (α,H,F ). By T1, IndHyp, P1, and I1,
T (α,H,F ) = +1 iff for all f in F , T (α,H, f) = +1
iff for all f in F , P (α,H, f) = +1 iff P (α,H,F ) = +1
iff for all f in F , (α,H) |− f iff (α,H) |−F .
Since p has a child, p does not satisfy T2.
If p satisfies T3 then the subject of p is (α,H, f). Let S(p) = {(α,H, f, r) : αr /∈H and
r∈Rsd[f ]}. By T3, IndHyp, P3, and I3, T (α,H, f) = +1
iff there exists (α,H, f, r) in S(p) such that T (α,H, f, r) = +1
iff there exists (α,H, f, r) in S(p) such that For (α,H, f, r) = +1
iff P (α,H, f) = +1.
iff there exists (α,H, f, r) in S(p) such that For (α,H, f, r) = +1
iff there exists (α,H, f, r) in S(p) such that (α,H+αr) |−A(r) and ∀s ∈ Foe(α, f, r),
Dftd(α,H, f, r, s) = +1
iff there exists (α,H, f, r) in S(p) such that (α,H+αr) |−A(r) and ∀s∈Foe(α, f, r),
either ∃t∈Rsd[f ; s] such that αt /∈H and (α,H+αt) |−A(t);
or α′s /∈H and (α′,H+α′s) 6|−A(s)
iff ∃r∈Rsd[f ] such that I3.1 and I3.2
iff (α,H) |− f .
If p satisfies T4 then the subject of p is (α,H, f, r). By T4, IndHyp, and P4,
T (α,H, f, r) = +1
iff T (α,H+αr,A(r)) = +1 and ∀s∈Foe(α, f, r), T (α,H, f, r, s) = +1
iff (α,H+αr) |−A(r) and ∀s∈Foe(α, f, r), Dftd(α,H, f, r, s) = +1
iff P (α,H+αr,A(r)) = +1 and ∀s∈Foe(α, f, r), Dftd(α,H, f, r, s) = +1
iff For (α,H, f, r) = +1.
If p satisfies T5 then the subject of p is (α,H, f, r, s). By T5, IndHyp, T6, T7, and P5,
T (α,H, f, r, s) = +1
iff either ∃t∈Rsd[f ; s] such that αt /∈H and T (α,H+αt,A(t)) = +1;
or α′s /∈H and T (−(α′,H+α′s,A(s))) = +1
iff either ∃t∈Rsd[f ; s] such that αt /∈H and P (α,H+αt,A(t)) = +1;
or α′s /∈H and T (α′,H+α′s,A(s)) = −1
iff either ∃t∈Rsd[f ; s] such that αt /∈H and P (α,H+αt,A(t)) = +1;
or α′s /∈H and P (α′,H+α′s,A(s)) = −1
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iff Dftd(α,H, f, r, s) = +1.
If p satisfies T6 then the subject of p is −(α′,H, F ). By T6, T7, and IndHyp,
T (−(α′,H, F )) = +1 iff T (α′,H, F ) = −1 iff P (α′,H, F ) = −1 iff (α′,H) 6|−F .
Thus the theorem is proved by induction.
EndProofThmA.8
Appendix B. Proof of Theorems 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5
Theorem B.1 (Theorem 7.2 Plausible Conjunction). Suppose (R,>) is a plausible
description, Ax = Ax(R), α∈Alg, H is an α-history, and f and g are both formulas. If
Ax |= f and (α,H) |− g then (α,H) |−
∧
{f, g}.
Proof
Suppose (R,>) is a plausible description, Ax = Ax(R), α∈Alg , H is an α-history, and f
and g are both formulas. Further suppose that Ax |= f and (α,H) |− g. We shall use
Definition 5.9.
Since (α,H) |− g, by Definition 5.9(I3), there exists r in Rsd[g] such that I3.1 and I3.2 both
hold. By Lemma A.5(4), there exists r in Rsd[
∧
{f, g}] such that I3.1 and I3.2 both hold.
Thus (α,H) |−
∧
{f, g}.
EndProofTheoremB.1
Theorem B.2 (Theorem 7.3 Right Weakening). Suppose (R,>) is a plausible description,
Ax = Ax (R), α∈Alg, H is an α-history, and f and g are both formulas.
1) If (α,H) |− f and Ax∪{f} |= g then (α,H) |− g. [Strong Right Weakening]
2) If (α,H) |− f and f |= g then (α,H) |− g. [Right Weakening]
3) If A→g ∈ Rs and (α,H) |−A then (α,H) |− g. [Modus Ponens for strict rules]
Proof
Suppose (R,>) is a plausible description, Ax = Ax(R), α∈Alg, H is an α-history, and
f and g are both formulas. Further suppose that (α,H) |− f . We shall use Definition 5.9.
(1) Suppose Ax∪{f} |= g.
If Ax |= f then Ax |= g and so by I2, (α,H) |− g. So suppose Ax 6|= f . Then α 6= ϕ.
Since (α,H) |− f , by I3.1 for f , ∃r0∈R
s
d[f ] such that αr0 /∈H and (α,H+αr0) |−A(r0).
By Lemma A.5(5)(b), Rsd[f ] ⊆ R
s
d[g]. Hence r0∈R
s
d[g]. So I3.1 holds for g.
By Lemma A.5(5)(d,e), R[¬g] ⊆ R[¬f ] and Foe(α, g, r0) ⊆ Foe(α, f, r0). By Lemma
A.5(5)(b,c), Rsd[f ] ⊆ R
s
d[g] and R
s
d[f ; s] ⊆ R
s
d[g; s].
Now take any s0 in Foe(α, g, r0). Then s0 ∈ Foe(α, f, r0). If I3.2.1 holds for f then
∃t0 ∈R
s
d[f ; s0] such that αt0 /∈H and (α,H+αt0) |−A(t0). Hence t0 ∈R
s
d[g; s0] and so
I3.2.1 holds for g. If I3.2.2 holds for f then α′s0 /∈H and (α
′,H+α′s0) 6|−A(s0). Hence
I3.2.2 holds for g.
Thus I3.2 holds for g and so (α,H) |− g.
(2) Suppose f |= g.
Since f |= g, we have Ax∪{f} |= g. So by part (1), (α,H) |− g.
(3) Suppose A→g ∈ Rs and (α,H) |−A.
By Lemma A.4(1), either A = {}, or A = {a} where a is formula.
Case 1: A = {}.
By Definition 5.4, g =
∧
Ax and so Ax |= g. By Definition 5.9(I2), (α,H) |− g.
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Case 2: A = {a} where a is formula.
By Definition 5.9(I1), (α,H) |− a. By Lemma A.4(2), Ax∪{a} |= g.
So by part (1), (α,H) |− g.
EndProofThmB.2
Definition B.3. Suppose H is an α-history. If α = ϕ then define H(ϕ :=pi′) to be the
sequence formed from H by just replacing each ϕ by pi′. If α∈{pi, pi′, ψ, ψ′, β, β′} then
define H(α :=pi′) to be the sequence formed from H by just replacing each α by pi′, and
each α′ by pi.
It is clear that H(α :=pi′) is a pi′-history.
Lemma B.4. Suppose P = (R,>) is a plausible theory, α∈Alg, H is an α-history, and x
is either a formula or a finite set of formulas. If (α,H) |−x then (pi′,H(α :=pi′)) |−x.
Hence P(α)⊆P(pi′).
Proof
Suppose (R,>) is a plausible theory. Let Y (n) denote the following conditional
statement.
“If α∈Alg, H is an α-history, f is a formula, F is a finite set of formulas, x∈{F, f},
T (α,H, x) = +1, and |T [α,H, x]| ≤ n then T (pi′,H(α :=pi′), x) = +1.”
By Theorem A.8(1,2), and Theorem A.7(1), it suffices to prove Y (n) by induction on n.
Suppose n = 1. Let the antecedent of Y (1) hold. Let the only node of T [α,H, x] be p0.
Let the root of T [pi′,H(α :=pi′), x] be q0.
If p0 satisfies T1 then x = {} and so q0 satisfies T1. So by T1, T [pi
′,H(α :=pi′), {}] has
only one node and T (pi′,H(α :=pi′), {}) = +1. If p0 satisfies T2 then x = f and Ax |= f .
So q0 satisfies T2 and hence T (pi
′,H(α :=pi′), f) = +1. Since p0 has no children and the
proof value of p0 is +1, p0 does not satisfy T3. Since the subject of p0 is (α,H, x), p0 does
not satisfy T4, or T5, or T6. Thus the base case holds.
Take any positive integer n. Suppose Y (n) is true. We shall prove Y (n+1).
Suppose the antecedent of Y (n+1) holds and that |T [α,H, x]| = n+1. Then
T (α,H, x) = +1. Let p0 be the root of T [α,H, x] and q0 be the root of T [pi
′,H(α :=pi′), x].
If p0 satisfies T1 then x = F . We see that q0 also satisfies T1. So
t(p0) = ((α,H,F ),min,+1) and t(q0) = ((pi
′,H(α :=pi′), F ),min, w0), where
w0 = T (pi
′,H(α :=pi′), F ) ∈ {+1,−1}. Let {pf : f ∈F} be the set of children of p0 and
{qf : f ∈F} be the set of children of q0. Let f be any formula in F . Then the subject of pf
is (α,H, f), and the subject of qf is (pi
′,H(α :=pi′), f). Also |T [α,H, f ]| ≤ n and the proof
value of pf is +1 because p0 is a min node with proof value +1. So by Y (n) the proof
value of qf is +1. But this is true for each f , so w0 = +1, as required.
Since p0 has a child, p0 does not satisfy T2.
If p0 satisfies T3 then x = f . We see that q0 also satisfies T3. So
t(p0) = ((α,H, f),max,+1) and t(q0) = ((pi
′,H(α :=pi′), f),max, w0), where
w0 = T (pi
′,H(α :=pi′), f) ∈ {+1,−1}.
We shall adopt the following naming conventions. Each non-root node of T [α,H, f ] is
denoted by pl(#, y) where l is the level of the node, # is the number in [1..6] such that the
node satisfies T#, and y is a rule, or a formula, or a set, which distinguishes siblings. The
proof value of pl(#, y) will be denoted by vl(#, y). For non-root nodes in
T [pi′,H(α :=pi′), f ] we shall use ql(#, y), and its proof value will be denoted by wl(#, y).
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Let the set of children of p0 be {p1(4, r) : αr /∈H and r∈R
s
d[f ]}, where the tags of
these children are: t(p1(4, r)) = ((α,H, f, r),min, v1(4, r)). So +1 = max{v1(4, r) : αr /∈H
and r∈Rsd[f ]}.
Let the set of children of q0 be {q1(4, r) : pi
′r /∈H(α :=pi′) and r∈Rsd[f ]}, where the
tags of these children are: t(q1(4, r)) = ((pi
′,H(α :=pi′), f, r),min, w1(4, r)). So
w0 = max{w1(4, r) : pi
′r /∈H(α :=pi′) and r∈Rsd[f ]}.
From above there exists r0 in R
s
d[f ] such that αr0 /∈H and v1(4, r0) = +1. By
Definition B.3, if pi′r0∈H(α :=pi
′) then αr0∈H. So if αr0 /∈H then pi
′r0 /∈H(α :=pi
′).
Hence q1(4, r0) exists. We shall show that w1(4, r0) = +1 and hence that w0 = +1, as
required.
Because p1(4, r0) is a min node whose proof value is +1, the proof value of every child
of p1(4, r0) must be +1. p2(1, r0) is a child of p1(4, r0) such that
t(p2(1, r0)) = ((α,H+αr0, A(r0)),min,+1).
The only child of q1(4, r0) is q2(1, r0) where
t(q2(1, r0)) = ((pi
′,H(α :=pi′)+pi′r0, A(r0)),min, w2(1, r0)). So w1(4, r0) = w2(1, r0).
Since |T [α,H+αr0, A(r0)]| ≤ n and T (α,H+αr0, A(r0)) = +1, by Y (n) we have
T (pi′,H(α :=pi′)+pi′r0, A(r0)) = w2(1, r0) = +1. Hence w1(4, r0) = +1 and so w0 = +1,
as required.
Since the subject of p0 is (α,H, x), p0 does not satisfy T4, or T5, or T6.
Thus Y (n), and hence the lemma, is proved by induction.
EndProofLemB.4
Definition B.5. Suppose Pd = (R,>) is a plausible description, α∈Alg, H is an
α-history, F is a finite set of formulas, f is a formula, r and s are any rules, T is an
evaluation tree of Pd, and p is any node of T . If Subj (p) ∈
{(α,H,F ), (α,H, f), (α,H, f, r), (α,H, f, r, s),−(α,H, F )} then the history of p, Hist(p),
is defined by Hist(p) = H, and the algorithm of p, alg(p), is defined by alg(p) = α.
Definition B.6. Suppose {α, λ} ⊆ Alg, H is a λ-history, and T is an evaluation tree of
some plausible theory. If λ /∈{α,α′} then define λ(α :α′) = λ; else define α(α :α′) = α′ and
α′(α :α′) = α. If H = (λ1r1, ..., λnrn) then define H(α :α
′) = (λ1(α :α
′)r1, ..., λn(α :α
′)rn).
Define T (α : α′) to be the tree formed from T by only changing the subject of each node
as follows. For each node p of T replace alg(p) by alg(p)(α : α′), and replace Hist(p) by
Hist(p)(α :α′).
Definition B.7. Suppose α∈Alg. α is isomorphic to α′, α ≃ α′, iff for each plausible
theory P, if T is an evaluation tree of P then T (α :α′) is an evaluation tree of P.
It should be clear that if α ≃ α′ then for each plausible theory P, P(α) = P(α′).
Lemma B.8. β ≃ β′. Hence for each plausible theory P, P(β) = P(β′).
Proof
Suppose α∈{β, β′} and P = (R,>) is a plausible theory. Let Y (n) denote the following
conditional statement. “If T is an evaluation tree of P and |T | ≤ n then T (α : α′) is an
evaluation tree of P.” By Definition 5.14, it suffices to prove Y (n) by induction on n. By
Definitions 5.13 and A.6, if T is an evaluation tree of P then either T = T [α,H, ...] or
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T = T [−(α′,H, F )]. So if T (α : α′) is an evaluation tree of P then either T (α : α′) =
T [α′,H(α :α′), ...] or T (α :α′) = T [−(α,H(α :α′), F )].
Suppose n = 1 and the antecedent of Y (1) holds. Let the root of T be p0. Since
α∈{β, β′}, without loss of generality we can suppose alg(p0) = α. Let the root of T (α :α
′)
be q0. Since p0 has no children, q0 has no children.
If p0 satisfies T1 then let Subj (p0) = (α,H, {}). Hence Subj (q0) = (α
′,H(α :α′), {}) and
so q0 satisfies T1. Thus T (α :α
′) is an evaluation tree of P.
If p0 satisfies T2 then let Subj (p0) = (α,H, f). Hence Subj (q0) = (α
′,H(α :α′), f) and so
q0 satisfies T2. Thus T (α :α
′) is an evaluation tree of P.
If p0 satisfies T3 then let Subj (p0) = (α,H, f). Hence Subj (q0) = (α
′,H(α :α′), f). Since
p0 has no children, S(p0) = {}. So if r∈R
s
d[f ] then αr∈H. Now αr∈H iff α
′r∈H(α :α′).
Hence S(q0) = {} and so q0 satisfies T3. Thus T (α :α
′) is an evaluation tree of P.
Since p0 and q0 have no children, p0 and q0 satisfy neither T4 nor T6.
If p0 satisfies T5 then let Subj (p0) = (α,H, f, r, s). Hence Subj (q0) = (α
′,H(α :α′), f, r, s).
Since p0 has no children, S(p0) = {} and so S(p0, α) = {}. Hence if t ∈ R
s
d[f ; s] then
αt∈H. Now αt∈H iff α′t∈H(α :α′).
Also α′s∈H. Hence αs∈H(α :α′). So S(q0, α
′) = {} and so S(q0) = {}. Thus q0 satisfies
T5 and so T (α :α′) is an evaluation tree of P.
All cases have been considered and so Y (1) holds.
If T is any tree and p is any node of T for which Subj (p) is defined, then define the set
S(p, T ) of subjects of the children of p in T by S(p, T ) = {Subj (c) : c is a child of p in T}.
Take any integer n such that n ≥ 1. Suppose that Y (n) is true. We shall prove Y (n+1).
Suppose the antecedent of Y (n+1) holds and that |T | = n+1. Let p0 be the root of T . If
alg(p0) /∈{α,α
′} then T (α :α′) is T and so T (α :α′) is an evaluation tree of P. So suppose
alg(p0)∈{α,α
′}. Let q0 be the root of T (α :α
′).
If p0 satisfies T1 then let Subj (p0) = (α,H,F ). Hence Subj (q0) = (α
′,H(α :α′), F ). So
q0 satisfies T1. Recall that S(p0, T [α,H,F ]) = {(α,H, f) : f ∈F}. So S(q0, T [α,H,F ](α :
α′)) = {(α′,H(α :α′), f) : f ∈F} = S(q0, T [α
′,H(α :α′), F ]), by T1. But for each (α,H, f)
in S(p0, T [α,H,F ]), T [α,H, f ] is an evaluation tree of P and |T [α,H, f ]| ≤ n. So by Y (n),
T [α,H, f ](α :α′) is an evaluation tree of P. Hence T [α,H, f ](α :α′) = T [α′,H(α : α′), f ].
Thus T (α :α′) = T [α,H,F ](α :α′) = T [α′,H(α :α′), F ] which is an evaluation tree of P.
Since p0 has a child, p0 does not satisfy T2.
If p0 satisfies T3 then let Subj (p0) = (α,H, f). Hence Subj (q0) = (α
′,H(α :α′), f). So
q0 satisfies T3. Recall that S(p0, T [α,H, f ]) = {(α,H, f, r) : αr /∈H and r∈R
s
d[f ]}. Since
αr ∈H iff α′r ∈H(α :α′) we have αr /∈H iff α′r /∈H(α :α′). So S(q0, T [α,H, f ](α :α
′))
= {(α′,H(α :α′), f, r) : αr /∈H and r∈Rsd[f ]} = {(α
′,H(α :α′), f, r) : α′r /∈H(α :α′) and
r∈Rsd[f ]} = S(q0, T [α
′,H(α :α′), f ]), by T3. But for each (α,H, f, r) in S(p0, T [α,H, f ]),
T [α,H, f, r] is an evaluation tree of P and |T [α,H, f, r]| ≤ n. So by Y (n), T [α,H, f, r](α :
α′) is an evaluation tree of P. Hence T [α,H, f, r](α : α′) = T [α′,H(α : α′), f, r]. Thus
T (α :α′) = T [α,H, f ](α :α′) = T [α′,H(α :α′), f ] which is an evaluation tree of P.
If p0 satisfies T4 then let Subj (p0) = (α,H, f, r). Hence Subj (q0) = (α
′,H(α :α′), f, r).
Since αr ∈ H iff α′r ∈ H(α : α′) we have αr /∈ H iff α′r /∈ H(α : α′). So q0 satisfies
T4. Recall that S(p0, T [α,H, f, r]) = {(α,H+αr,A(r))}∪{(α,H, f, r, s) : s∈Foe(α, f, r)}.
Since Foe(α, f, r) = Foe(α′, f, r), S(q0, T [α,H, f, r](α :α
′)) = {(α′,H(α :α′)+α′r,A(r))} ∪
{(α′,H(α :α′), f, r, s) : s∈Foe(α, f, r)} = S(q0, T [α
′,H(α :α′), f, r]), by T4. But T [α,H+
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αr,A(r)] is an evaluation tree of P and |T [α,H+αr,A(r)]| ≤ n. So by Y (n), T [α,H+
αr,A(r)](α :α′) is an evaluation tree of P. Hence T [α,H+αr,A(r)](α :α′) = T [α′,H(α :α′)+
α′r,A(r)]. Also for each (α,H, f, r, s) in S(p0, T [α,H, f, r]), T [α,H, f, r, s] is an evaluation
tree of P and |T [α,H, f, r, s]| ≤ n. So by Y (n), T [α,H, f, r, s](α :α′) is an evaluation tree of
P. Hence T [α,H, f, r, s](α :α′) = T [α′,H(α :α′), f, r, s]. Thus T (α :α′) = T [α,H, f, r](α :
α′) = T [α′,H(α :α′), f, r] which is an evaluation tree of P.
If p0 satisfies T5 then let Subj (p0) = (α,H, f, r, s). Hence Subj (q0) = (α
′,H(α :
α′), f, r, s). Since αr ∈H iff α′r ∈H(α : α′) we have αr /∈H iff α′r /∈H(α : α′). So q0
satisfies T5. Recall that S(p0, T [α,H, f, r, s]) = {(α,H+αt,A(t)) : αt /∈H and t∈R
s
d[f ; s]}
∪ {−(α′,H+α′s,A(s)) : α′s /∈H}. Also since α′r∈H iff αr ∈H(α :α′) we have α′r /∈H
iff αr /∈H(α :α′). So S(q0, T [α,H, f, r, s](α :α
′)) = {(α′,H(α :α′)+α′t, A(t)) : αt /∈H and
t∈Rsd[f ; s]}∪{−(α,H(α :α
′)+αs,A(s)) : α′s /∈H}
= {(α′,H(α :α′)+α′t, A(t)) : α′t /∈H(α :α′) and t∈Rsd[f ; s]} ∪ {−(α,H(α :α
′)+αs,A(s)) :
αs /∈H(α :α′)}
= S(q0, T [α
′,H(α :α′), f, r, s]), by T5.
But for each (α,H+αt,A(t)) in S(p0, T [α,H, f, r, s]), T [α,H+αt,A(t)] is an evaluation
tree of P and |T [α,H+αt,A(t)]| ≤ n. So by Y (n), T [α,H+αt,A(t)](α :α′) is an evaluation
tree of P. Hence T [α,H+αt,A(t)](α : α′) = T [α′,H(α :α′)+αt,A(t)]. Also if −(α′,H+
α′s,A(s)) ∈ S(p0, T [α,H, f, r, s]), then T [−(α
′,H+α′s,A(s))] is an evaluation tree of P and
|T [−(α′,H+α′s,A(s))]| ≤ n. So by Y (n), T [−(α′,H+α′s,A(s))](α : α′) is an evaluation
tree of P. Hence T [−(α′,H+α′s,A(s))](α :α′) = T [−(α,H(α :α′)+αs,A(s))].
Thus T (α :α′) = T [α,H, f, r, s](α :α′) = T [α′,H(α :α′), f, r, s] which is an evaluation
tree of P.
If p0 satisfies T6 then let Subj (p0) = −(α
′,H, F ). Hence Subj (q0) = −(α,H(α :α
′), F ).
So q0 satisfies T6. Recall that S(p0, T [−(α
′,H, F )]) = {(α′,H, F )}. So
S(q0, T [−(α
′,H, F )](α :α′)) = {(α,H(α :α′), F )} = S(q0, T [−(α,H(α :α
′), F )]), by T6. But
T [α′,H, F ] is an evaluation tree of P and |T [α′,H, F ]| ≤ n. So by Y (n), T [α′,H, F ](α :α′)
is an evaluation tree of P. Hence T [α′,H, F ](α :α′) = T [α,H(α :α′), F ]. Thus T (α :α′) =
T [−(α′,H, F )](α :α′) = T [−(α,H(α :α′), F )] which is an evaluation tree of P.
Therefore Y (n+1), and hence the lemma, is proved by induction.
EndProofLemB.8
Lemma B.9. Suppose P = (R,>) is a plausible theory, H is a ψ-history, and x is either
a formula or a finite set of formulas. If (ψ,H) |−x then (ψ′,H(ψ :ψ′)) |−x.
Hence P(ψ)⊆P(ψ′).
Proof
Suppose (R,>) is a plausible theory. Let Y (n) denote the following conditional state-
ment. “If H is a ψ-history, F is a finite set of formulas, f is a formula, x ∈ {F, f},
T (ψ,H, x) = +1, and |T [ψ,H, x]| ≤ n then T (ψ′,H(ψ :ψ′), x) = +1.”
By Theorem A.8(1,2), and Theorem 7.1(1), it suffices to prove Y (n) by induction on n.
Suppose n = 1. Let the antecedent of Y (1) hold. Let the only node of T [ψ,H, x] be p0.
Let the root of T [ψ′,H(ψ :ψ′), x] be q0.
If p0 satisfies T1 then x = {} and so q0 satisfies T1. So by T1, T [ψ
′,H(ψ :ψ′), {}] has
only one node and T (ψ′,H(ψ :ψ′), {}) = +1. If p0 satisfies T2 then x = f and Ax |= f .
So q0 satisfies T2 and hence T (ψ
′,H(ψ : ψ′), f) = +1. Since p0 has no children and the
41
Billington
proof value of p0 is +1, p0 does not satisfy T3. Since the subject of p0 is (ψ,H, x), p0 does
not satisfy T4, or T5, or T6. Thus the base case holds.
Take any positive integer n. Suppose Y (n) is true. We shall prove Y (n+1).
Suppose the antecedent of Y (n+1) holds and that |T [ψ,H, x]| = n+1. Then T (ψ,H, x) =
+1. Let p0 be the root of T [ψ,H, x] and q0 be the root of T [ψ
′,H(ψ :ψ′), x].
If p0 satisfies T1 then x = F . We see that q0 also satisfies T1. So
t(p0) = ((ψ,H,F ),min,+1) and t(q0) = ((ψ
′,H(ψ :ψ′), F ),min, w0), where
w0 = T (ψ
′,H(ψ : ψ′), F ) ∈ {+1,−1}. Let {pf : f ∈ F} be the set of children of p0 and
{qf : f ∈F} be the set of children of q0. Let f be any formula in F . Then the subject of pf
is (ψ,H, f), and the subject of qf is (ψ
′,H(ψ :ψ′), f). Also |T [ψ,H, f ]| ≤ n and the proof
value of pf is +1 because p0 is a min node with proof value +1. So by Y (n) the proof value
of qf is +1. But this is true for each f , so w0 = +1, as required.
Since p0 has a child, p0 does not satisfy T2.
If p0 satisfies T3 then x = f . We see that q0 also satisfies T3. So
t(p0) = ((ψ,H, f),max,+1) and t(q0) = ((ψ
′,H(ψ :ψ′), f),max, w0), where
w0 = T (ψ
′,H(ψ :ψ′), f) ∈ {+1,−1}.
We shall adopt the following naming conventions. Each non-root node of T is denoted
by pl(#, y) where l is the level of the node, # is the number in [1..6] such that the node
satisfies T#, and y is a rule, or a formula, or a set, which distinguishes siblings. The proof
value of pl(#, y) will be denoted by vl(#, y). For non-root nodes in T [ψ
′,H(ψ :ψ′), f ] we
shall use ql(#, y), and its proof value will be denoted by wl(#, y).
Let the set of children of p0 be {p1(4, r) : ψr /∈H and r ∈R
s
d[f ]}, where the tags of
these children are:
t(p1(4, r)) = ((ψ,H, f, r),min, v1(4, r)). So +1 = max{v1(4, r) : ψr /∈H and r∈R
s
d[f ]}.
Let the set of children of q0 be {q1(4, r) : ψ
′r /∈ H(ψ : ψ′) and r ∈ Rsd[f ]}, where
the tags of these children are: t(q1(4, r)) = ((ψ
′,H(ψ : ψ′), f, r),min, w1(4, r)). So w0 =
max{w1(4, r) : ψ
′r /∈H(ψ :ψ′) and r∈Rsd[f ]}.
From above there exists r0 in R
s
d[f ] such that ψr0 /∈H and v1(4, r0) = +1. By Definition
B.6, if ψ′r0∈H(ψ :ψ
′) then ψr0∈H. So if ψr0 /∈H then ψ
′r0 /∈H(ψ :ψ
′). Hence q1(4, r0)
exists. We shall show that w1(4, r0) = +1 and hence that w0 = +1, as required.
Let the set of children of p1(4, r0) be {p2(1, r0)} ∪ {p2(5, s) : s∈Foe(ψ, f, r0)}, where
the tags of these children are: t(p2(1, r0)) = ((ψ,H+ψr0, A(r0)),min, v2(1, r0)); and
t(p2(5, s)) = ((ψ,H, f, r0, s),max, v2(5, s)).
So +1 = v1(4, r0) = min[{v2(1, r0)} ∪ {v2(5, s) : s∈Foe(ψ, f, r0)}].
Hence v2(1, r0) = +1; and for each s in Foe(ψ, f, r0), v2(5, s) = +1.
Let the set of children of q1(4, r0) be {q2(1, r0)} ∪ {q2(5, s) : s∈R[¬f ; r0]}, where the
tags of these children are: t(q2(1, r0)) = ((ψ
′,H(ψ : ψ′)+ψ′r0, A(r0)),min, w2(1, r0)); and
t(q2(5, s)) = ((ψ
′,H(ψ :ψ′), f, r0, s),max, w2(5, s)).
So w1(4, r0) = min[{w2(1, r0)} ∪ {w2(5, s) : s∈R[¬f ; r0]}].
Since v2(1, r0) = +1, T (ψ,H+ψr0, A(r0)) = +1 and |T [ψ,H+ψr0, A(r0)]| ≤ n. So by
Y (n), w2(1, r0) = T (ψ
′,H(ψ :ψ′)+ψ′r0, A(r0)) = +1. Therefore w1(4, r0) = min{w2(5, s) :
s ∈ R[¬f ; r0]}. If R[¬f ; r0] = {} then w1(4, r0) = min{} = +1 as desired. So suppose
R[¬f ; r0] 6= {}.
Since R[¬f ; r0]⊆Foe(ψ, f, r0), if q2(5, s) exists then p2(5, s) exists.
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For each node, p2(5, s), let the set of children of p2(5, s) be {p3(1, t) : ψt /∈ H and
t ∈ Rsd[f ; s]} ∪ {p3(6, s) : ψ
′s /∈ H}, where the tags of these children are: t(p3(1, t)) =
((ψ,H+ψt,A(t)),min, v3(1, t)); and t(p3(6, s)) = (−(ψ
′,H+ψ′s,A(s)),−, v3(6, s)).
So +1 = v2(5, s) = max[{v3(1, t) : ψt /∈H and t∈R
s
d[f ; s]} ∪ {v3(6, s) : ψ
′s /∈H}].
For each node, q2(5, s), let the set of children of q2(5, s) be {q3(1, t) : ψ
′t /∈ H(ψ :
ψ′) and t ∈ Rsd[f ; s]} ∪ {q3(6, s) : ψs /∈ H(ψ : ψ
′)}, where the tags of these children
are: t(q3(1, t)) = ((ψ
′,H(ψ : ψ′)+ψ′t, A(t)),min, w3(1, t)); and t(q3(6, s)) = (−(ψ,H(ψ :
ψ′)+ψs,A(s)),−, w3(6, s)). So w2(5, s) = max[{w3(1, t) : ψ
′t /∈H(ψ :ψ′) and t∈Rsd[f ; s]} ∪
{w3(6, s) : ψs /∈H(ψ :ψ
′)}].
By Definition B.6, ψt∈H iff ψ′t∈H(ψ :ψ′). So ψt /∈H iff ψ′t /∈H(ψ :ψ′). Therefore
p3(1, t) exists iff q3(1, t) exists. If there exists t0 ∈ R
s
d[f ; s] such that v3(1, t0) = +1
then T (ψ,H+ψt0, A(t0)) = +1 and |T [ψ,H+ψt0, A(t0)]| ≤ n so by Y (n), w3(1, t0) =
T (ψ′,H(ψ :ψ′)+ψ′t0, A(t0)) = +1. Hence w2(5, s) = +1.
So suppose no such t0 ∈ R
s
d[f ; s] exists. Then p3(6, s) exists such that ψ
′s /∈H and
v3(6, s) = +1. By Definition B.6, ψ
′s∈H iff ψs∈H(ψ :ψ′). So ψ′s /∈H iff ψs /∈H(ψ :ψ′).
Hence q3(6, s) exists.
Let the child of p3(6, s) be p4(1, s) where t(p4(1, s)) = ((ψ
′,H+ψ′s,A(s)),min, v4(1, s))
and v3(6, s) = −v4(1, s). So v4(1, s) = −1.
Let the child of q3(6, s) be q4(1, s) where
t(q4(1, s)) = ((ψ,H(ψ :ψ
′)+ψs,A(s)),min, w4(1, s)) and w3(6, s) = −w4(1, s).
Assume w4(1, s) = +1. Then T (ψ,H(ψ :ψ
′)+ψs,A(s)) = +1 and
|T [ψ,H(ψ : ψ′)+ψs,A(s)]| ≤ n so by Y (n), T (ψ′,H(ψ : ψ′)(ψ : ψ′)+ψ′s,A(s)) = +1. But
H(ψ : ψ′)(ψ : ψ′) = H. So T (ψ′,H+ψ′s,A(s)) = +1. From above −1 = v4(1, s) =
T (ψ′,H+ψ′s,A(s)) = +1. This contradiction shows that w4(1, s) = −1. Hence w3(6, s) =
+1 and so w2(5, s) = +1.
So in both cases for all s in R[¬f ; r0], w2(5, s) = +1 and so w1(4, r0) = +1. Hence
w0 = +1, as required.
Since the subject of p0 is (ψ,H, x), p0 does not satisfy T4, or T5, or T6.
Thus Y (n), and hence the lemma, is proved by induction.
EndProofLemB.9
Lemma B.10. Suppose (R,>) is a plausible theory, Ax = Ax (R), and f is a formula. If
f is satisfiable and Ax 6|= f then Rsd[f ] is finite.
Proof
Suppose (R,>) is a plausible theory, Ax = Ax (R), and f is a formula. Also suppose
f is satisfiable and Ax 6|= f . Take any α in Alg−{ϕ}. By Definition 5.14, T [α, (), f ] is
finite, and so its root has only finitely many children. The root of T [α, (), f ] satisfies T3 of
Definition 5.13. Therefore Rsd[f ] is finite.
EndProofLemB.10
Theorem B.11 (Theorem 7.4 Consistency). Suppose (R,>) is a plausible theory,
Ax = Ax (R), α∈{ϕ, pi, ψ, β, β′}, and both f and g are any formulas.
1) If α |− f and α |− g then Ax∪{f, g} is satisfiable.
2) If (ψ,H) |− f then (ψ′,H) 6|− ¬f .
3) Suppose that whenever s∈Rsd[¬f ] and (pi
′,H+pi′s) |−A(s) then Rsd[f ; s] = {}.
If (pi,H) |− f then (pi′,H) 6|− ¬f .
43
Billington
Proof
Suppose (R,>) is a plausible theory, Ax = Ax (R), α∈{ϕ, pi, ψ, β, β′}, and both f and
g are any formulas.
(1) Suppose α |− f and α |− g. So by Theorem A.8(2), T (α, (), f) = +1 and
T (α, (), g) = +1.
Let p0 be the root of T [α, (), f ] and q0 be the root of T [α, (), g]. Since the subject of p0
is (α, (), f), p0 does not satisfy T1, or T4, or T5, or T6. Since the subject of q0 is (α, (), g),
q0 does not satisfy T1, or T4, or T5, or T6. Therefore p0 satisfies T2 or T3, and q0
satisfies T2 or T3. So there are four cases to consider.
Case 1: p0 satisfies T2 and q0 satisfies T2.
Then Ax |= f and Ax |= g. By Lemma A.3(1), Ax is satisfiable. Therefore Ax∪{f, g} is
satisfiable.
Case 2: p0 satisfies T2 and q0 satisfies T3.
Then Ax |= f , r∈R[f ], Ax 6|= g, and α 6= ϕ. So α∈{pi, ψ, β, β′}. Assume Ax∪{f, g} is
unsatisfiable. By Lemma A.5(6), R[f ] ⊆ R[¬g]. So r∈R[¬g]. By T3, q0 has a child, q1, in
T [α, (), g] such that t(q1) = ((α, (), g, rg),min,+1) and rg∈R
s
d[g]. By T4, q1 has a child,
q2, in T [α, (), g] such that t(q2) = ((α, (), g, rg , r),max,+1). By T5, q2 has a child, q3, in
T [α, (), g] such that pv(q3) = +1. By T5, Subj (q3) ∈ S(q2). By Definition 5.5(3),
Rsd[g; r] = {} and so S(q2) = S(q2, α). However, A(r) = {}. So
t(q3) = (−(α
′, (α′r), {}),−,+1). By T6, q3 has a child, q4 in T [α, (), g] such that
Subj (q4) = (α
′, (α′r), {}). So by T1, pv(q4) = +1. But by T7,
+1 = pv(q3) = −pv(q4) = −1. This contradiction shows that Ax∪{f, g} is satisfiable.
Case 3: p0 satisfies T3 and q0 satisfies T2.
This case is the same as Case 2 but with p and q interchanged and with f and g
interchanged. So by doing the indicated interchanges the proof for Case 2 becomes a proof
for Case 3.
Case 4: p0 satisfies T3 and q0 satisfies T3.
Then Ax 6|= f , Ax 6|= g, and α 6= ϕ. So α∈{pi, ψ, β, β′}. By T3, p0 has a child, p1, in
T [α, (), f ] such that t(p1) = ((α, (), f, rf ),min,+1) and rf ∈R
s
d[f ]. By T3, q0 has a child,
q1, in T [α, (), g] such that t(q1) = ((α, (), g, rg),min,+1) and rg∈R
s
d[g].
Assume Ax∪{f, g} is unsatisfiable. By Lemma A.5(6), Rsd[f ] ⊆ R[f ] ⊆ R[¬g] and
Rsd[g] ⊆ R[g] ⊆ R[¬f ]. So rf ∈R[¬g] and rg∈R[¬f ].
By T4, either rf>rg; or p1 has a child, p2(rg), in T [α, (), f ] such that
Subj (p2(rg)) = (α, (), f, rf , rg) and pv(p2(rg)) = +1. By T5, p2(rg) has a child, p3(rg) in
T [α, (), f ] such that pv(p3(rg)) = +1 and Subj (p3(rg)) ∈ S(p2(rg)).
Similarly by T4, either rg>rf ; or q1 has a child, q2(rf ), in T [α, (), g] such that
Subj (q2(rf )) = (α, (), g, rg , rf ) and pv(q2(rf )) = +1. By T5, q2(rf ) has a child, q3(rf ) in
T [α, (), g] such that pv(q3(rf )) = +1 and Subj (q3(rf )) ∈ S(q2(rf )).
Case 4.1: Subj (p3(rg)) = −(α
′, (α′rg), A(rg)).
Since pv(p3(rg)) = +1, T (α
′, (α′rg), A(rg)) = −1. So by Theorem A.8(1),
(α′, (α′rg)) 6|−A(rg). But Subj (q2(rg)) = (α, (αrg), A(rg)) and pv(q2(rg)) = +1. So
T (α, (αrg), A(rg)) = +1. By Theorem A.8(1), (α, (αrg)) |−A(rg). By Lemmas B.4, B.9,
and B.8, (α′, (α′rg)) |−A(rg). This contradiction shows that Case 4.1 cannot occur. Thus
Subj (p3(rg)) = (α, (αt), A(t)) where t∈R
s
d[f ; rg].
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Case 4.2: Subj (q3(rf )) = −(α
′, (α′rf ), A(rf )).
This case is the same as Case 4.1 but with p and q interchanged and with f and g
interchanged. So by doing the indicated interchanges the proof that Case 4.1 cannot occur
becomes a proof that Case 4.2 cannot occur. Thus Subj (q3(rf )) = (α, (αt), A(t)) where
t∈Rsd[g; rf ].
In summary Cases 4.1 and 4.2 have shown that we have
either rf >rg or there is a t in R
s
d[f ; rg]; and also
either rg>rf or there is a t in R
s
d[g; rf ].
So there exists tf (1) in R
s
d[f ; rg] ⊆ R
s
d[f ] ⊆ R[f ] ⊆ R[¬g]. Hence tf (1) > rg and
tf (1) ∈ R[¬g]. So q2(rf ) can be replaced by q2(tf (1)), and q3(rf ) can be replaced by
q3(tf (1)).
Also there exists tg(1) in R
s
d[g; rf ] ⊆ R
s
d[g] ⊆ R[g] ⊆ R[¬f ]. Hence tg(1) > rf and
tg(1) ∈ R[¬f ]. So p2(rg) can be replaced by p2(tg(1)), and p3(rg) can be replaced by
p3(tg(1)).
Similarly, the arguments in Cases 4.1 and 4.2 for these new nodes yield rules tf (2) and
tg(2) with the following properties: tf (2) ∈ R
s
d[f ; tg(1)] ⊆ R
s
d[f ] ⊆ R[f ] ⊆ R[¬g]; and
tg(2) ∈ R
s
d[g; tf (1)] ⊆ R
s
d[g] ⊆ R[g] ⊆ R[¬f ]. So tf (2) > tg(1) and tf (2)∈R[¬g] and
tg(2) > tf (1) and tg(2)∈R[¬f ]. Hence tf (2) > tg(1) > rf and tg(2) > tf (1) > rg.
This process can be continued indefinitely to yield the following sequences of rules.
rf < tg(1) < tf (2) < tg(3) < tf (4) < ... and rg < tf (1) < tg(2) < tf (3) < tg(4) < ... Now each
tf (i)∈R
s
d[f ] and each tg(i)∈R
s
d[g]. Since α |− f and α |− g, by Lemma A.3(5), both f
and g are satisfiable. But Ax 6|= f and Ax 6|= g, so by Lemma B.10, both Rsd[f ] and R
s
d[g]
are finite. So for some i and some j>i, tf (2i) = tf (2j). Hence > is cyclic, which
contradicts the definition of > as being acyclic. This contradiction shows that Ax∪{f, g}
is satisfiable.
(2) If H is a ψ-history then H is also a ψ′-history. Suppose (ψ,H) |− f . We shall use
Definition 5.9. Assume (ψ′,H) |−¬f .
By I3.1 for ¬f , (*1) ∃s1∈R
s
d[¬f ] such that (ψ
′,H+ψ′s1) |−A(s1). By I3.2 for f either
(ψ′,H+ψ′s1) 6|−A(s1), which contradicts (*1), or (*2) ∃r2∈R
s
d[f ; s1] such that
(ψ,H+ψr2) |−A(r2). By I3.2 for ¬f either (ψ,H+ψr2) 6|−A(r2), which contradicts (*2),
or (*3) ∃s3∈R
s
d[¬f ; r2] such that (ψ
′,H+ψ′s3) |−A(s3). By I3.2 for f either
(ψ′,H+ψ′s3) 6|−A(s3), which contradicts (*3), or (*4) ∃r4∈R
s
d[f ; s3] such that
(ψ,H+ψr4) |−A(r4). So we have r4 > s3 > r2 > s1.
We can continue the reasoning in the above paragraph to create two arbitrarily long
sequences s1, s3, ..., s2i−1, ... and r2, r4, ..., r2i, ... such that each s2i−1∈R
s
d[¬f ] and each
r2i∈R
s
d[f ]. Moreover for each odd i, si+2 > ri+1 > si. Since (ψ,H) |− f , by Lemma
A.3(5), f is satisfiable and Ax 6|= ¬f . Since (ψ′,H) |−¬f , by Lemma A.3(5), ¬f is
satisfiable and Ax 6|= f . So by Lemma B.10, both Rsd[f ] and R
s
d[¬f ] are finite. So there is
an even j and an even k such that j < k and rj = rk. Hence > is cyclic, contradicting its
acyclicity. Thus (2) is proved.
(3) Suppose that (*) whenever s∈Rsd[¬f ] and (pi
′,H+pi′s) |−A(s) then Rsd[f ; s] = {}.
If H is a pi-history then H is also a pi′-history. Suppose (pi,H) |− f . We shall use
Definition 5.9. Assume (pi′,H) |−¬f .
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By I3.1 for ¬f , (**) ∃s1∈R
s
d[¬f ] such that (pi
′,H+pi′s1) |−A(s1). By I3.2 for f either
(pi′,H+pi′s1) 6|−A(s1), which contradicts (**), or ∃r2∈R
s
d[f ; s1] such that
(pi,H+pir2) |−A(r2), which contradicts (*). Thus (3) is proved.
EndProofThmB.11
Theorem B.12 (Theorem 7.5 Truth values). Suppose (R,>) is a plausible theory,
α∈Alg , F is a finite set of formulas, and f is a formula.
1) V (α,¬¬f) = V (α, f).
2) V (α, f) = t iff V (α,¬f) = f.
3) V (α, f) = f iff V (α,¬f) = t.
4) V (α, f) = a iff V (α,¬f) = a.
5) V (α, f) = u iff V (α,¬f) = u.
6) If V (α,
∧
F ) = t then for each f in F , V (α, f) = t.
7) If f ∈F and V (α, f) = t then V (α,
∨
F ) = t.
8) If α∈{ϕ, pi, ψ, β, β′} then V (α, f)∈{t, f,u}.
9) If V (α, f) = a then α∈{ψ′, pi′}.
10) If V (α, f) = t then α |− f . (completeness)
11) If α∈{ϕ, pi, ψ, β, β′} and α |− f then V (α, f) = t. (soundness)
Proof
Suppose (R,>) is a plausible theory, α∈Alg, F is a finite set of formulas, and f is a
formula. By Theorem 7.3(2), α |− f iff α |−¬¬f ; and so α 6|− f iff α 6|− ¬¬f .
(1) This follows from Definition 5.18 and the equivalences noted above.
(2) V (α, f) = t iff α |− f and α 6|− ¬f . V (α,¬f) = f iff α 6|− ¬f and α |−¬¬f . So
(2) holds.
(3) V (α, f) = f iff α 6|− f and α |−¬f . V (α,¬f) = t iff α |−¬f and α 6|− ¬¬f . So
(3) holds.
(4) V (α, f) = a iff α |− f and α |−¬f . V (α,¬f) = a iff α |−¬f and α |−¬¬f . So
(4) holds.
(5) V (α, f) = u iff α 6|− f and α 6|− ¬f . V (α,¬f) = u iff α 6|− ¬f and α 6|− ¬¬f . So
(5) holds.
(6) Suppose V (α,
∧
F ) = t. Then α |−
∧
F and α 6|− ¬
∧
F . By Theorem B.2(2), for
each f in F , α |− f . Take any f in F and assume α |−¬f . By Theorem B.2(2), α |−
∨
¬F ,
where ¬F = {¬f : f ∈F}. So by Theorem B.2(2), α |−¬
∧
F . This contradiction shows
that for each f in F , α 6|− ¬f . Thus for each f in F , V (α, f) = t.
(7) Suppose f ∈F and V (α, f) = t. Then α |− f and α 6|− ¬f . By Theorem B.2(2),
α |−
∨
F . Assume α |−¬
∨
F . By Theorem B.2(2), α |−
∧
¬F and so α |−¬f . This
contradiction shows that α 6|− ¬
∨
F . Thus V (α,
∨
F ) = t.
(8) Suppose α∈{ϕ, pi, ψ, β, β′}. Recall V (α, f) = a iff α |− f and α |−¬f . So by
Theorem 7.4(1), V (α, f) 6= a.
(9) This is just the contrapositive of part (8).
(10) Recall V (α, f) = t iff α |− f and α 6|− ¬f .
(11) Suppose α∈{ϕ, pi, ψ, β, β′} and α |− f . By Definition 5.18 and α |− f we have
V (α, f)∈{a, t}. So by part (8), V (α, f) = t.
EndProofThmB.12
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Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 7.6
Lemma C.1. Suppose P = (R,>) is a plausible theory, α∈Alg , I is a ϕ-history, H is an
α-history, and x is either a formula or a finite set of formulas.
If (ϕ, I) |−x then (α,H) |−x. Hence P(ϕ)⊆P(α).
Proof
Suppose (R,>) is a plausible theory, Ax = Ax(R), α∈Alg , H is an α-history, and x is
either a formula or a finite set of formulas. Let (ϕ, I) |−x. We shall use Definition 5.9.
Case 1: x is a formula.
Let x = f . Then (ϕ, I) |− f . By Definition 5.9(I2), Ax |= f and (α,H) |− f .
Case 2: x is a finite set of formulas.
Let x = F . Then (ϕ, I) |−F . By I1, for all f in F , (ϕ, I) |− f . By Case 1, (α,H) |− f .
So by I1, (α,H) |−F .
EndProofLemC.1
Definition C.2. If H is a pi-history then define H(pi :=ψ) to be the sequence formed from
H by just replacing each pi by ψ, and each pi′ by ψ′.
Lemma C.3. Suppose P = (R,>) is a plausible theory, H is a pi-history, and x is either
a formula or a finite set of formulas. If (pi,H) |−x then (ψ,H(pi :=ψ)) |−x.
Hence P(pi)⊆P(ψ).
Proof
Suppose (R,>) is a plausible theory and Ax is its set of axioms. Let Y (n) denote the
following conditional statement.
“If H is a pi-history, x is either a formula or a finite set of formulas, T (pi,H, x) = +1, and
|T [pi,H, x]| ≤ n then T (ψ,H(pi :=ψ), x) = +1.”
By Theorem A.8(1,2), and Theorem A.7(1), it suffices to prove Y (n) by induction on n.
Suppose n = 1. Let the antecedent of Y (1) hold. Let p0 be the root of T [pi,H, x] and
q0 be the root of T [ψ,H(pi :=ψ), x]. Then p0 has no children. If p0 satisfies T1 then
x = {} and so q0 satisfies T1. So by T1, T [ψ,H(pi :=ψ), {}] has only one node and
T (ψ,H(pi :=ψ), {}) = +1. If p0 satisfies T2 then x = f and Ax |= f . So q0 satisfies T2
and hence T (ψ,H(pi :=ψ), f) = +1. Since p0 has no children and the proof value of p0 is
+1, p0 does not satisfy T3. Since the subject of p0 is (pi,H, x), p0 does not satisfy T4, or
T5, or T6. Thus the base case holds.
Take any positive integer n. Suppose that Y (n) is true. We shall prove Y (n+1).
Suppose the antecedent of Y (n+1) holds and that |T [pi,H, x]| = n+1. Let p0 be the
root of T [pi,H, x] and q0 be the root of T [ψ,H(pi :=ψ), x].
If p0 satisfies T1 then let x be F . We see that q0 also satisfies T1. So
t(p0) = ((pi,H,F ),min,+1) and t(q0) = ((ψ,H(pi :=ψ), F ),min, w0), where
w0 = T (ψ,H(pi :=ψ), F ) ∈ {+1,−1}. Let {pf : f ∈F} be the set of children of p0 and
{qf : f ∈F} be the set of children of q0. Let f be any formula in F . Then the subject of pf
is (pi,H, f), and the subject of qf is (ψ,H(pi :=ψ), f). Also |T [pi,H, f ]| ≤ n and the proof
value of pf is +1 because p0 is a min node with proof value +1. So by Y (n) the proof
value of qf is +1. But this is true for each f , so w0 = +1, as required.
Since p0 has a child, p0 does not satisfy T2.
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If p0 satisfies T3 then let x be f . We see that q0 also satisfies T3. So
t(p0) = ((pi,H, f),max,+1) and t(q0) = ((ψ,H(pi :=ψ), f),max, w0), where
w0 = T (ψ,H(pi :=ψ), f) ∈ {+1,−1}.
We shall adopt the following naming conventions. Each non-root node of T [pi,H, f ] is
denoted by pl(#, y) where l is the level of the node, # is the number in [1..6] such that the
node satisfies T#, and y is a rule, or a formula, or a set, which distinguishes siblings. The
proof value of pl(#, y) will be denoted by vl(#, y). For non-root nodes in
T [ψ,H(pi :=ψ), f ] we shall use ql(#, y), and its proof value will be denoted by wl(#, y).
Let the set of children of p0 be {p1(4, r) : pir /∈H and r∈R
s
d[f ]}, where the tags of
these children are:
t(p1(4, r)) = ((pi,H, f, r),min, v1(4, r)). So +1 = max{v1(4, r) : pir /∈H and r∈R
s
d[f ]}.
Let the set of children of q0 be {q1(4, r) : ψr /∈H(pi :=ψ) and r∈R
s
d[f ]}, where the
tags of these children are: t(q1(4, r)) = ((ψ,H(pi :=ψ), f, r),min, w1(4, r)). So
w0 = max{w1(4, r) : ψr /∈H(pi :=ψ) and r∈R
s
d[f ]}.
From above there exists r0 in R
s
d[f ] such that pir0 /∈H and v1(4, r0) = +1. So
t(p1(4, r0)) = ((pi,H, f, r0),min,+1).
Let the set of children of p1(4, r0) be {p2(1, r0)} ∪ {p2(5, s) : s∈Foe(pi, f, r0)}, where
the tags of these children are: t(p2(1, r0)) = ((pi,H+pir0, A(r0)),min, v2(1, r0)); and
t(p2(5, s)) = ((pi,H, f, r0, s),max, v2(5, s)). So +1 = v1(4, r0) = min[{v2(1, r0)} ∪
{v2(5, s) : s∈Foe(pi, f, r0)}]. Hence v2(1, r0) = +1; and for each s in Foe(pi, f, r0),
v2(5, s) = +1.
Let the set of children of q1(4, r0) be {q2(1, r0)} ∪ {q2(5, s) : s∈Foe(ψ, f, r0)}, where
the tags of these children are: t(q2(1, r0)) = ((ψ,H(pi :=ψ)+ψr0, A(r0)),min, w2(1, r0));
and t(q2(5, s)) = ((ψ,H(pi :=ψ), f, r0, s),max, w2(5, s)).
So w1(4, r0) = min[{w2(1, r0)} ∪ {w2(5, s) : s∈Foe(ψ, f, r0)}].
Since |T [pi,H+pir0, A(r0)]| < n and T (pi,H+pir0, A(r0)) = v2(1, r0) = +1, by Y (n) we
have T (ψ,H(pi :=ψ)+ψr0, A(r0)) = w2(1, r0) = +1. Hence
(*) w1(4, r0) = min{w2(5, s) : s∈Foe(ψ, f, r0)}.
For each s in Foe(pi, f, r0) let the set of children of p2(5, s) be
{p3(1, t) : pit /∈H and t∈R
s
d[f ; s]} ∪ {p3(6, s) : pi
′s /∈H}, where the tags of these children
are: t(p3(1, t)) = ((pi,H+pit,A(t)),min, v3(1, t)); and
t(p3(6, s)) = (−(pi
′,H+pi′s,A(s)),−, v3(6, s)).
So +1 = v2(5, s) = max[{v3(1, t) : pit /∈H and t∈R
s
d[f ; s]} ∪ {v3(6, s) : pi
′s /∈H}.
For each s in Foe(ψ, f, r0) let the set of children of q2(5, s) be {q3(1, t) : ψt /∈H(pi :=ψ)
and t∈Rsd[f ; s]} ∪ {q3(6, s) : ψ
′s /∈H(pi :=ψ)}, where the tags of these children are:
t(q3(1, t)) = ((ψ,H(pi :=ψ)+ψt,A(t)),min, w3(1, t)); and
t(q3(6, s)) = (−(ψ
′,H(pi :=ψ)+ψ′s,A(s)),−, w3(6, s)).
So w2(5, s) = max[{w3(1, t) : ψt /∈H(pi :=ψ) and t∈R
s
d[f ; s]} ∪
{w3(6, s) : ψ
′s /∈H(pi :=ψ)}].
Take any s in Foe(ψ, f, r0). We shall show that w2(5, s) = +1.
Suppose there exists t0 such that pit0 /∈H and t0∈R
s
d[f ; s] and
+1 = v3(1, t0) = T (pi,H+pit0, A(t0)). Then p3(1, t0) exists, and ψt0 /∈H(pi :=ψ) and so
q3(1, t0) exists. Since |T [pi,H+pit0, A(t0)]| < n, then by Y (n) we have
T (ψ,H(pi :=ψ)+ψt0, A(t0)) = w3(1, t0) = +1. Hence w2(5, s) = +1.
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So suppose that such a t0 does not exist. Then v3(6, s) = +1 and so p3(6, s) exists and
pi′s /∈H. Hence ψ′s /∈H(pi :=ψ), and so q3(6, s) exists. Let the child of p3(6, s) be p4(1, s)
where t(p4(1, s)) = ((pi
′,H+pi′s,A(s)),min, v4(1, s)). Then +1 = v3(6, s) = −v4(1, s). So
v4(1, s) = −1 and hence T (pi
′,H+pi′s,A(s)) = −1. By Theorem A.8(1),
(pi′,H+pi′s) 6|−A(s). By Definition B.3 with α = ψ′ and Definition C.2,
H(pi :=ψ)(ψ′ :=pi′) = H and (ψ′s)(ψ′ :=pi′) = (pi′s).
Let the child of q3(6, s) be q4(1, s) where
t(q4(1, s)) = ((ψ
′,H(pi :=ψ)+ψ′s,A(s)),min, w4(1, s)). Then w3(6, s) = −w4(1, s).
Assume w4(1, s) = +1. Then T (ψ
′,H(pi :=ψ)+ψ′s,A(s)) = +1 and so by
Theorem A.8(1), (ψ′,H(pi :=ψ)+ψ′s) |−A(s). By Lemma B.4 with α = ψ′,
(pi′,H(pi :=ψ)(ψ′ :=pi′)++(ψ′s)(ψ′ :=pi′)) |−A(s). But from the previous paragraph, this
simplifies to (pi′,H+pi′s) |−A(s). This contradiction shows that w4(1, s) = −1. Hence
w3(6, s) = +1. Therefore w2(5, s) = +1.
Thus for all s in Foe(ψ, f, r0), w2(5, s) = +1. So by (*), w1(4, r0) = +1 and hence
w0 = +1, as required.
Since the subject of p0 is (pi,H, x), p0 does not satisfy T4, or T5, or T6.
Thus Y (n), and hence the lemma, is proved by induction.
EndProofLemC.3
Definition C.4. If H is a ψ-history then define H(ψ :=β) to be the sequence formed from
H by just replacing each ψ by β, and each ψ′ by β′.
Lemma C.5. Suppose P = (R,>) is a plausible theory, H is a ψ-history, and x is either
a formula or a finite set of formulas.
1) If (ψ,H) |−x then (β,H(ψ :=β)) |−x.
2) If (ψ′,H) 6|−x then (β′,H(ψ :=β)) 6|−x.
Hence P(ψ)⊆P(β) and P(β′)⊆P(ψ′).
Proof
Suppose (R,>) is a plausible theory, Ax is its set of axioms, H is a ψ-history, and x is
either a formula or a finite set of formulas. Note that H is a ψ-history iff H is a
ψ′-history. Let Y (k) and Z(k) denote the following conditional statements.
Y (k): If H is a ψ-history, x is either a formula or a finite set of formulas,
T (ψ,H, x) = +1, and |T [ψ,H, x]| ≤ k then T (β,H(ψ :=β), x) = +1.
Z(k): If H is a ψ′-history, x is either a formula or a finite set of formulas,
T (ψ′,H, x) = −1, and |T [ψ′,H, x]| ≤ k then T (β′,H(ψ :=β), x) = −1.
By Theorem A.8(1,2) and Theorem A.7(2) it suffices to prove Y (k) and Z(k) by induction
on k.
Suppose k = 1.
Let the antecedent of Y (1) hold. Let p0 be the root of T [ψ,H, x] and q0 be the root of
T [β,H(ψ :=β), x]. Then p0 has no children. If p0 satisfies T1 then x = {} and so q0
satisfies T1. So by T1, T [β,H(ψ :=β), {}] has only one node and
T (β,H(ψ :=β), {}) = +1. If p0 satisfies T2 then x = f and Ax |= f . So q0 satisfies T2
and hence T (β,H(ψ :=β), f) = +1. Since p0 has no children and the proof value of p0 is
+1, p0 does not satisfy T3. Since the subject of p0 is (ψ,H, x), p0 does not satisfy T4 or
T5 or T6. Thus Y (1) holds.
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Let the antecedent of Z(1) hold. Let m0 be the root of T [ψ
′,H, x] and n0 be the root
of T [β′,H(ψ :=β), x]. Then m0 has no children. Since pv(m0) = T (ψ
′,H, x) = −1, m0
does not satisfy T1 or T2. If m0 satisfies T3 then x = f and for each r∈R
s
d[f ], ψ
′r∈H.
So n0 satisfies T3 and for each r∈R
s
d[f ], β
′r∈H(ψ :=β). Hence by T3, n0 has no children
and so −1 = pv(n0) = T (β
′,H(ψ :=β), f). Since the subject of m0 is (ψ
′,H, x), m0 does
not satisfy T4 or T5 or T6. Thus Z(1) holds.
Take any positive integer k. Suppose that both Y (k) and Z(k) are true. We shall
prove both Y (k+1) and Z(k+1).
Suppose the antecedent of Y (k+1) holds and |T [ψ,H, x]| = k+1. We must show
T (β,H(ψ :=β), x) = +1. Let p0 be the root of T [ψ,H, x] and q0 be the root of
T [β,H(ψ :=β), x].
If p0 satisfies T1 then let x be F . We see that q0 also satisfies T1. So
t(p0) = ((ψ,H,F ),min,+1) and t(q0) = ((β,H(ψ :=β), F ),min, w0), where
w0 = T (β,H(ψ :=β), F ) ∈ {+1,−1}. Let {pf : f ∈F} be the set of children of p0 and
{qf : f ∈F} be the set of children of q0. Let f be any formula in F . Then the subject of pf
is (ψ,H, f), and the subject of qf is (β,H(ψ :=β), f). Also |T [ψ,H, f ]| ≤ k and the proof
value of pf is +1 because p0 is a min node with proof value +1. So by Y (k) the proof
value of qf is +1. But this is true for each f , so by T1, w0 = +1, as required.
Since p0 has a child, p0 does not satisfy T2.
If p0 satisfies T3 then let x be f . We see that q0 also satisfies T3. So
t(p0) = ((ψ,H, f),max,+1) and t(q0) = ((β,H(ψ :=β), f),max, w0), where
w0 = T (β,H(ψ :=β), f) ∈ {+1,−1}.
We shall adopt the following naming conventions. Each non-root node of T [ψ,H, f ] is
denoted by pl(#, y) where l is the level of the node, # is the number in [1..6] such that the
node satisfies T#, and y is a rule, or a formula, or a set, which distinguishes siblings. The
proof value of pl(#, y) will be denoted by vl(#, y). For non-root nodes in
T [β,H(ψ :=β), f ] we shall use ql(#, y), and its proof value will be denoted by wl(#, y).
Let the set of children of p0 be {p1(4, r) : ψr /∈H and r∈R
s
d[f ]}, where the tags of
these children are:
t(p1(4, r)) = ((ψ,H, f, r),min, v1(4, r)). So +1 = max{v1(4, r) : ψr /∈H and r∈R
s
d[f ]}.
Hence there exists r0 in R
s
d[f ] such that ψr0 /∈H and v1(4, r0) = +1. So
t(p1(4, r0)) = ((ψ,H, f, r0),min,+1).
Let the set of children of q0 be {q1(4, r) : βr /∈H(ψ :=β) and r∈R
s
d[f ]}, where the
tags of these children are: t(q1(4, r)) = ((β,H(ψ :=β), f, r),min, w1(4, r)). So
w0 = max{w1(4, r) : βr /∈H(ψ :=β) and r∈R
s
d[f ]}.
Let the set of children of p1(4, r0) be {p2(1, r0)} ∪ {p2(5, s) : s∈Foe(ψ, f, r0)}, where
the tags of these children are: t(p2(1, r0)) = ((ψ,H+ψr0, A(r0)),min, v2(1, r0)); and
t(p2(5, s)) = ((ψ,H, f, r0, s),max, v2(5, s)). So +1 = v1(4, r0) = min[{v2(1, r0)} ∪
{v2(5, s) : s∈Foe(ψ, f, r0)}]. Hence v2(1, r0) = +1; and for each s in Foe(ψ, f, r0),
v2(5, s) = +1.
Let the set of children of q1(4, r0) be {q2(1, r0)} ∪ {q2(5, s) : s∈Foe(β, f, r0)}, where
the tags of these children are: t(q2(1, r0)) = ((β,H(ψ :=β)+βr0, A(r0)),min, w2(1, r0));
and t(q2(5, s)) = ((β,H(ψ :=β), f, r0, s),max, w2(5, s)).
So w1(4, r0) = min[{w2(1, r0)} ∪ {w2(5, s) : s∈Foe(β, f, r0)}].
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Since |T [ψ,H+ψr0, A(r0)]| ≤ k and T (ψ,H+ψr0, A(r0)) = v2(1, r0) = +1, by Y (k) we
have T (β,H(ψ :=β)+βr0, A(r0)) = w2(1, r0) = +1. Hence
(*) w1(4, r0) = min{w2(5, s) : s∈Foe(β, f, r0)}.
For each s in Foe(ψ, f, r0) let the set of children of p2(5, s) be
{p3(1, t) : ψt /∈H and t∈R
s
d[f ; s]} ∪ {p3(6, s) : ψ
′s /∈H}, where the tags of these children
are: t(p3(1, t)) = ((ψ,H+ψt,A(t)),min, v3(1, t)); and
t(p3(6, s)) = (−(ψ
′,H+ψ′s,A(s)),−, v3(6, s)).
So +1 = v2(5, s) = max[{v3(1, t) : ψt /∈H and t∈R
s
d[f ; s]} ∪ {v3(6, s) : ψ
′s /∈H}].
For each s in Foe(β, f, r0) let the set of children of q2(5, s) be {q3(1, t) : βt /∈H(ψ :=β)
and t∈Rsd[f ; s]} ∪ {q3(6, s) : β
′s /∈H(ψ :=β)}, where the tags of these children are:
t(q3(1, t)) = ((β,H(ψ :=β)+βt,A(t)),min, w3(1, t)); and
t(q3(6, s)) = (−(β
′,H(ψ :=β)+β′s,A(s)),−, w3(6, s)).
So w2(5, s) = max[{w3(1, t) : βt /∈H(ψ :=β) and t∈R
s
d[f ; s]} ∪
{w3(6, s) : β
′s /∈H(ψ :=β)}].
Take any s in Foe(β, f, r0). We shall show that w2(5, s) = +1. Observe that
Foe(ψ, f, r0) = Foe(β, f, r0).
Suppose there exists t0 such that ψt0 /∈H and t0∈R
s
d[f ; s] and
+1 = v3(1, t0) = T (ψ,H+ψt0, A(t0)). Then p3(1, t0) exists. Since ψt0∈H iff
βt0∈H(ψ :=β), we have βt0 /∈H(ψ :=β) and so q3(1, t0) exists. Since
|T [ψ,H+ψt0, A(t0)]| ≤ k, then by Y (k) we have
T (β,H(ψ :=β)+βt0, A(t0)) = w3(1, t0) = +1. Hence w2(5, s) = +1.
So suppose that such a t0 does not exist. Then v3(6, s) = +1 and so p3(6, s) exists and
ψ′s /∈H. Since ψ′s∈H iff β′s∈H(ψ :=β), we have β′s /∈H(ψ :=β), and so q3(6, s) exists.
Let the child of p3(6, s) be p4(1, s) where t(p4(1, s)) = ((ψ
′,H+ψ′s,A(s)),min, v4(1, s)).
Then +1 = v3(6, s) = −v4(1, s). So v4(1, s) = −1 and hence T (ψ
′,H+ψ′s,A(s)) = −1.
Since |T [ψ′,H+ψ′s,A(s)]| ≤ k, then by Z(k), T (β′,H(ψ :=β)+β′s,A(s)) = −1.
Let the child of q3(6, s) be q4(1, s) where
t(q4(1, s)) = ((β
′,H(ψ :=β)+β′s,A(s)),min, w4(1, s)). Then w3(6, s) = −w4(1, s) =
−T (β′,H(ψ :=β)+β′s,A(s)) = +1. Therefore w2(5, s) = +1.
Thus for all s in Foe(β, f, r0), w2(5, s) = +1. So by (*), w1(4, r0) = +1 and hence
w0 = +1, as required.
Since the subject of p0 is (ψ,H, x), p0 does not satisfy T4, or T5, or T6.
Thus Y (k+1) is proved.
To prove Z(k+1) we suppose the antecedent of Z(k+1) holds and |T [ψ′,H, x]| = k+1.
We must show T (β′,H(ψ :=β), x) = −1. Let m0 be the root of T [ψ
′,H, x] and n0 be the
root of T [β′,H(ψ :=β), x]. Then m0 has a child and pv(m0) = T (ψ
′,H, x) = −1.
If m0 satisfies T1 then let x be F . We see that n0 also satisfies T1. So
t(m0) = ((ψ
′,H, F ),min,−1) and t(n0) = ((β
′,H(ψ :=β), F ),min, pv(n0)), where
pv(n0) = T (β
′,H(ψ :=β), F ) ∈ {+1,−1}. Let {mf : f ∈F} be the set of children of m0
and {nf : f ∈F} be the set of children of n0. Let f be any formula in F . Then the subject
of mf is (ψ
′,H, f), and the subject of nf is (β
′,H(ψ :=β), f). Also |T [ψ′,H, f ]| ≤ k.
There exists f0∈F such at pv (mf0) = −1 because m0 is a min node with proof value −1.
So by Z(k), pv(nf0) = T (β
′,H(ψ :=β), f0) = −1. But n0 is a min node, so pv(n0) = −1,
as required.
Since pv(m0) = T (ψ
′,H, x) = −1, m0 does not satisfy T2.
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If m0 satisfies T3 then let x be f . We see that n0 also satisfies T3. So
t(m0) = ((ψ
′,H, f),max,−1) and t(n0) = ((β
′,H(ψ :=β), f),max, pv (n0)), where
pv(n0) = T (β
′,H(ψ :=β), f) ∈ {+1,−1}.
We shall adopt the following naming conventions. Each non-root node of T [ψ′,H, f ] is
denoted by ml(#, y) where l is the level of the node, # is the number in [1..6] such that
the node satisfies T#, and y is a rule, or a formula, or a set, which distinguishes siblings.
For non-root nodes in T [β′,H(ψ :=β), f ] we shall use nl(#, y).
Let the set of children of m0 be {m1(4, r) : ψ
′r /∈H and r∈Rsd[f ]}, where the tags of
these children are: t(m1(4, r)) = ((ψ
′,H, f, r),min, pv (m1(4, r))). Recall that m0 has at
least one child. So −1 = max{pv (m1(4, r)) : ψ
′r /∈H and r∈Rsd[f ]}. Hence if ψ
′r /∈H
and r∈Rsd[f ] then pv(m1(4, r)) = −1. Therefore t(m1(4, r)) = ((ψ
′,H, f, r),min,−1).
Let the set of children of n0 be {n1(4, r) : β
′r /∈H(ψ :=β) and r∈Rsd[f ]}, where the
tags of these children are: t(n1(4, r)) = ((β
′,H(ψ :=β), f, r),min, pv (n1(4, r))). So
pv(n0) = max{pv (n1(4, r)) : β
′r /∈H(ψ :=β) and r∈Rsd[f ]}. If n0 does not have a child
then pv(n0) = max{} = −1, as required. So suppose that n0 has at least one child.
If ψ′r /∈H and r∈Rsd[f ] then let the set of children of m1(4, r) be {m2(1, r)} ∪
{m2(5, s) : s∈R[¬f ; r]}, where the tags of these children are:
t(m2(1, r)) = ((ψ
′,H+ψ′r,A(r)),min, pv(m2(1, r))); and
t(m2(5, s)) = ((ψ
′,H, f, r, s),max, pv (m2(5, s))). So −1 = pv(m1(4, r)) =
min[{pv(m2(1, r))} ∪ {pv (m2(5, s)) : s∈R[¬f ; r]}]. Therefore either pv(m2(1, r)) = −1 or
there exists s0 in R[¬f ; r] such that pv(m2(5, s0)) = −1.
If β′r /∈H(ψ :=β) and r∈Rsd[f ] then let the set of children of n1(4, r) be
{n2(1, r)} ∪ {n2(5, s) : s∈Foe(β
′, f, r)}, where the tags of these children are:
t(n2(1, r)) = ((β
′,H(ψ :=β)+β′r,A(r)),min, pv(n2(1, r))); and
t(n2(5, s)) = ((β
′,H(ψ :=β), f, r, s),max, pv(n2(5, s))).
So pv(n1(4, r)) = min[{pv (n2(1, r))} ∪ {pv (n2(5, s)) : s∈Foe(β
′, f, r)}].
We show that for each r in Rsd[f ] such that β
′r /∈H(ψ :=β), pv(n1(4, r)) = −1.
We have |T [ψ′,H+ψ′r,A(r)]| ≤ k. If −1 = pv(m2(1, r)) = T (ψ
′,H+ψ′r,A(r)) then
by Z(k), pv(n2(1, r)) = T (β
′,H(ψ :=β)+β′r,A(r)) = −1. Hence pv(n1(4, r)) = −1.
So suppose there exists s0 in R[¬f ; r] such that T (ψ
′,H, f, r, s0) = pv(m2(5, s0)) = −1.
Then s0∈Foe(β
′, f, r). We shall show that T (β′,H(ψ :=β), f, r, s0) = pv(n2(5, s0)) = −1,
and hence that pv(n1(4, r)) = −1.
Let the set of children of m2(5, s0) be
{m3(1, t) : ψ
′t /∈H and t∈Rsd[f ; s0]} ∪ {m3(6, s0) : ψs0 /∈H}, where the tags of these
children are: t(m3(1, t)) = ((ψ
′,H+ψ′t, A(t)),min, pv (m3(1, t))), and
t(m3(6, s0)) = (−(ψ,H+ψs0, A(s0)),−, pv (m3(6, s0))).
So −1 = pv(m2(5, s0)) = max[{pv (m3(1, t)) : ψ
′t /∈H and t∈Rsd[f ; s0]} ∪
{pv (m3(6, s0)) : ψs0 /∈H}]. Hence for all t in R
s
d[f ; s0] such that ψ
′t /∈H we have
−1 = pv(m3(1, t)) = T (ψ
′,H+ψ′t, A(t)). Also if ψs0 /∈H then
−1 = pv(m3(6, s0)) = T (−(ψ,H+ψs0, A(s0))).
Let the set of children of n2(5, s0) be
{n3(1, t) : β
′t /∈H(ψ :=β) and t∈Rsd[f ; s0]} ∪ {n3(6, s0) : βs0 /∈H(ψ :=β)}, where the tags
of these children are: t(n3(1, t)) = ((β
′,H(ψ :=β)+β′t, A(t)),min, pv(n3(1, t))), and
t(n3(6, s0)) = (−(β,H(ψ :=β)+βs0, A(s0)),−, pv (n3(6, s0))).
So pv(n2(5, s0)) = max[{pv (n3(1, t)) : β
′t /∈H(ψ :=β) and t∈Rsd[f ; s0]} ∪
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{pv (n3(6, s0)) : βs0 /∈H(ψ :=β)}]. If n2(5, s0) has no children then
pv(n2(5, s0)) = max{} = −1, as required. So suppose that n2(5, s0) has at least one child.
Case 1: n3(1, t) is a child of n2(5, s0).
Then β′t /∈H(ψ :=β) and t∈Rsd[f ; s0]. Hence ψ
′t /∈H. So from above,
−1 = pv(m3(1, t)) = T (ψ
′,H+ψ′t, A(t)). Also |T [ψ′,H+ψ′t, A(t)]| ≤ k. So by Z(k),
−1 = T (β′,H(ψ :=β)+β′t, A(t)) = pv(t(n3(1, t))).
Case 2: n3(6, s0) is a child of n2(5, s0).
Then βs0 /∈H(ψ :=β). Hence ψs0 /∈H. So from above,
−1 = pv(m3(6, s0)) = T (−(ψ,H+ψs0, A(s0))). Therefore T (ψ,H+ψs0, A(s0)) = +1. Also
|T [ψ,H+ψs0, A(s0)]| ≤ k. So by Y (k), T (β,H(ψ :=β)+βs0, A(s0)) = +1. But
pv(n3(6, s0)) = −T (β,H(ψ :=β)+βs0, A(s0)) = −+ 1 = −1.
These two cases show that pv(n2(5, s0)) = −1, as required. Hence pv(n1(4, r)) = −1.
Therefore pv(n0) = −1. Thus Z(k+1) is proved.
Therefore Y (k) and Z(k) are proved by induction, and so the lemma is proved.
EndProofLemC.5
Definition C.6. Suppose {α, γ, λ}⊆Alg , H is a α-history, and T is an evaluation tree of
some plausible theory. If α /∈{γ, γ′, λ, λ′} then define α(γ :λ) = α; else define γ(γ :λ) = λ,
γ′(γ :λ) = λ′, λ(γ :λ) = γ, and λ′(γ :λ) = γ′.
If H = (α1r1, ..., αnrn) then define H(γ :λ) = (α1(γ :λ)r1, ..., αn(γ :λ)rn).
Define T (γ :λ) to be the tree formed from T by only changing the subject of each node
as follows. For each node p of T replace alg(p) by alg(p)(γ : λ), and replace Hist(p) by
Hist(p)(γ :λ).
Lemma C.7. Suppose P = (R,>) is a plausible theory such that > is empty. If T is an
evaluation tree of P then T (pi :ψ) is an evaluation tree of P.
Hence P(ψ) = P(pi) and P(pi′) = P(ψ′).
Proof
Let P = (R,>) be a plausible theory such that > is empty. Then
Foe(ψ′, f, r) = {} = Foe(pi′, f, r) and Foe(pi, f, r) = R[¬f ] = Foe(ψ, f, r). Let Y (n) denote
the following conditional statement.
“If T is an evaluation tree of P and |T | ≤ n then T (pi :ψ) is an evaluation tree of P.”
By Definition 5.14, it suffices to prove Y (n) by induction on n.
Suppose n = 1 and the antecedent of Y (1) holds. Let the root of T be p0 and
alg(p0) = α. If α /∈{pi, ψ, ψ
′, pi′} then T (pi :ψ) = T and so Y (1) holds. So suppose
α∈{pi, ψ, ψ′, pi′}. Let the root of T (pi :ψ) be q0, and let alg(q0) = λ. So α(pi :ψ) = λ.
Since p0 has no children, q0 has no children.
If p0 satisfies T1 then let Subj (p0) = (α,H, {}). Hence Subj (q0) = (λ,H(pi :ψ), {}) and so
q0 satisfies T1. Thus T (pi :ψ) is an evaluation tree of P.
If p0 satisfies T2 then let Subj (p0) = (α,H, f). Hence Subj (q0) = (λ,H(pi :ψ), f) and so
q0 satisfies T2. Thus T (pi :ψ) is an evaluation tree of P.
If p0 satisfies T3 then let Subj (p0) = (α,H, f). Hence Subj (q0) = (λ,H(pi :ψ), f). Since p0
has no children, S(p0) = {}. So if r∈R
s
d[f ] then αr∈H. Now αr∈H iff λr∈H(pi :ψ).
Hence S(q0) = {} and so q0 satisfies T3. Thus T (pi :ψ) is an evaluation tree of P.
Since p0 and q0 have no children, p0 and q0 satisfy neither T4 nor T6.
If p0 satisfies T5 then let Subj (p0) = (α,H, f, r, s). Hence Subj (q0) = (λ,H(pi :ψ), f, r, s).
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Since p0 has no children, S(p0) = {}. Hence if t∈R
s
d[f ; s] then αt∈H. Now αt∈H iff
λt∈H(pi :ψ). Also α′s∈H. Hence λ′s∈H(pi :ψ). So S(q0) = {}. Thus q0 satisfies T5 and
so T (pi :ψ) is an evaluation tree of P.
All cases have been considered and so Y (1) holds.
If T is any tree and p is any node of T for which Subj (p) is defined, then define the set
S(p, T ) of subjects of the children of p in T by S(p, T ) = {Subj (c) : c is a child of p in T}.
Take any integer n such that n ≥ 1. Suppose that Y (n) is true. We shall prove
Y (n+1). Suppose the antecedent of Y (n+1) holds and that |T | = n+1. Let the root of T
be p0 and alg(p0) = α. If α /∈{pi, ψ, ψ
′, pi′} then T (pi :ψ) = T and so Y (n+1) holds. So
suppose α∈{pi, ψ, ψ′, pi′}. Let the root of T (pi :ψ) be q0, and let alg(q0) = λ. So
α(pi :ψ) = λ.
If p0 satisfies T1 then let Subj (p0) = (α,H,F ). Hence Subj (q0) = (λ,H(pi :ψ), F ). So
q0 satisfies T1. Recall that S(p0, T [α,H,F ]) = {(α,H, f) : f ∈F}. So
S(q0, T [α,H,F ](pi :ψ)) = {(λ,H(pi :ψ), f) : f ∈F} = S(q0, T [λ,H(pi :ψ), F ]), by T1. But
for each (α,H, f) in S(p0, T [α,H,F ]), T [α,H, f ] is an evaluation tree of P and
|T [α,H, f ]| ≤ n. So by Y (n), T [α,H, f ](pi :ψ) is an evaluation tree of P. Hence
T [α,H, f ](pi :ψ) = T [λ,H(pi :ψ), f ]. Thus T (pi :ψ) = T [α,H,F ](pi :ψ) = T [λ,H(pi :ψ), F ]
which is an evaluation tree of P.
Since p0 has a child, p0 does not satisfy T2.
If p0 satisfies T3 then let Subj (p0) = (α,H, f). Hence Subj (q0) = (λ,H(pi :ψ), f). So
q0 satisfies T3. Recall that S(p0, T [α,H, f ]) = {(α,H, f, r) : αr /∈H and r∈R
s
d[f ]}. Since
αr∈H iff λr∈H(pi :ψ) we have αr /∈H iff λr /∈H(pi :ψ). So S(q0, T [α,H, f ](pi :ψ)) =
{(λ,H(pi :ψ), f, r) : αr /∈H and r∈Rsd[f ]} = {(λ,H(pi :ψ), f, r) : λr /∈H(pi :ψ) and
r∈Rsd[f ]} = S(q0, T [λ,H(pi :ψ), f ]), by T3. But for each (α,H, f, r) in S(p0, T [α,H, f ]),
T [α,H, f, r] is an evaluation tree of P and |T [α,H, f, r]| ≤ n. So by Y (n),
T [α,H, f, r](pi :ψ) is an evaluation tree of P. Hence T [α,H, f, r](pi :ψ) =
T [λ,H(pi :ψ), f, r]. Thus T (pi :ψ) = T [α,H, f ](pi :ψ) = T [λ,H(pi :ψ), f ] which is an
evaluation tree of P.
If p0 satisfies T4 then let Subj (p0) = (α,H, f, r). Hence Subj (q0) = (λ,H(pi :ψ), f, r).
Since αr∈H iff λr∈H(pi :ψ) we have αr /∈H iff λr /∈H(pi :ψ). So q0 satisfies T4. Recall
that S(p0, T [α,H, f, r]) = {(α,H+αr,A(r))} ∪ {(α,H, f, r, s) : s∈Foe(α, f, r)}. Since
Foe(α, f, r) = Foe(λ, f, r), S(q0, T [α,H, f, r](pi :ψ)) = {(λ,H(pi :ψ)+λr,A(r))} ∪
{(λ,H(pi :ψ), f, r, s) : s∈Foe(α, f, r)} = S(q0, T [λ,H(pi :ψ), f, r]), by T4. But
T [α,H+αr,A(r)] is an evaluation tree of P and |T [α,H+αr,A(r)]| ≤ n. So by Y (n),
T [α,H+αr,A(r)](pi :ψ) is an evaluation tree of P. Hence T [α,H+αr,A(r)](pi :ψ) =
T [λ,H(pi :ψ)+λr,A(r)]. Also for each (α,H, f, r, s) in S(p0, T [α,H, f, r]), T [α,H, f, r, s] is
an evaluation tree of P and |T [α,H, f, r, s]| ≤ n. So by Y (n), T [α,H, f, r, s](pi :ψ) is an
evaluation tree of P. Hence T [α,H, f, r, s](pi :ψ) = T [λ,H(pi :ψ), f, r, s]. Thus T (pi :ψ) =
T [α,H, f, r](pi :ψ) = T [λ,H(pi :ψ), f, r] which is an evaluation tree of P.
If p0 satisfies T5 then let Subj (p0) = (α,H, f, r, s). Then α 6= pi
′. Since
s∈Foe(α, f, r), Foe(α, f, r) 6= {} and so α 6= ψ′. Therefore α∈{pi, ψ} and so λ∈{pi, ψ}.
Now Subj (q0) = (λ,H(pi :ψ), f, r, s). Since αr∈H iff λr∈H(pi :ψ) we have αr /∈H iff
λr /∈H(pi :ψ). So q0 satisfies T5. Recall that S(p0, T [α,H, f, r, s]) =
{(α,H+αt,A(t)) : αt /∈H and t∈Rsd[f ; s]}∪ {−(α
′,H+α′s,A(s)) : α′s /∈H}. Also since
α′s∈H iff λ′s∈H(pi :ψ) we have α′s /∈H iff λ′s /∈H(pi :ψ). So S(q0, T [α,H, f, r, s](pi :ψ))
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= {(λ,H(pi :ψ)+λt,A(t)) : αt /∈H and t∈Rsd[f ; s]}∪{−(λ
′,H(pi :ψ)+λ′s,A(s)) : α′s /∈H}
= {(λ,H(pi :ψ)+λt,A(t)) : λt /∈H(pi :ψ) and t∈Rsd[f ; s]}∪
{−(λ′,H(pi :ψ)+λ′s,A(s)) : λ′s /∈H(pi :ψ)}
= S(q0, T [λ,H(pi :ψ), f, r, s]), by T5.
But for each (α,H+αt,A(t)) in S(p0, T [α,H, f, r, s]), T [α,H+αt,A(t)] is an evaluation
tree of P and |T [α,H+αt,A(t)]| ≤ n. So by Y (n), T [α,H+αt,A(t)](pi :ψ) is an evaluation
tree of P. Hence T [α,H+αt,A(t)](pi :ψ) = T [λ,H(pi :ψ)+λt,A(t)]. Also if
−(α′,H+α′s,A(s)) ∈ S(p0, T [α,H, f, r, s]), then T [−(α
′,H+α′s,A(s))] is an evaluation
tree of P and |T [−(α′,H+α′s,A(s))]| ≤ n. So by Y (n), T [−(α′,H+α′s,A(s))](pi :ψ) is an
evaluation tree of P. Hence T [−(α′,H+α′s,A(s))](pi :ψ) = T [−(λ′,H(pi :ψ)+λ′s,A(s))].
Thus T (pi :ψ) = T [α,H, f, r, s](pi :ψ) = T [λ,H(pi :ψ), f, r, s] which is an evaluation tree
of P.
If p0 satisfies T6 then let Subj (p0) = −(α
′,H, F ). Then α∈{pi, ψ} and so λ∈{ψ, pi}.
Hence Subj (q0) = −(λ
′,H(pi :ψ), F ). So q0 satisfies T6. Recall that S(p0, T [−(α
′,H, F )])
= {(α′,H, F )}. So S(q0, T [−(α
′,H, F )](pi :ψ)) = {(λ′,H(pi :ψ), F )} =
S(q0, T [−(λ
′,H(pi :ψ), F )]), by T6. But T [α′,H, F ] is an evaluation tree of P and
|T [α′,H, F ]| ≤ n. So by Y (n), T [α′,H, F ](pi :ψ) is an evaluation tree of P. Hence
T [α′,H, F ](pi :ψ) = T [λ′,H(pi :ψ), F ]. Thus T (pi :ψ) = T [−(α′,H, F )](pi :ψ) =
T [−(λ′,H(pi :ψ), F )] which is an evaluation tree of P.
Therefore Y (n+1), and hence the lemma, is proved by induction.
EndProofLemC.7
Theorem C.8 (Theorem 7.6 The proof algorithm hierarchy). Suppose P = (R,>) is a
plausible theory.
1) P(ϕ) ⊆ P(pi) ⊆ P(ψ) ⊆ P(β) = P(β′) ⊆ P(ψ′) ⊆ P(pi′).
2) If > is empty then P(ϕ) ⊆ P(pi) = P(ψ) ⊆ P(β) = P(β′) ⊆ P(ψ′) = P(pi′).
Proof
Suppose P = (R,>) is a plausible theory. By Lemma C.1, P(ϕ) ⊆ P(pi). By Lemma
C.3, P(pi) ⊆ P(ψ). By Lemma C.5(1), P(ψ) ⊆ P(β). By Lemma B.8, P(β) = P(β′). By
Lemma C.5(2), P(β′) ⊆ P(ψ′). By Lemma B.4, P(ψ′) ⊆ P(pi′). So part (1) holds.
Part (2) holds by part (1) and Lemma C.7.
EndProofThmC.8
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